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The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which has been at the heart of
mainstream finance theory since the mid 1960s, holds that market covariance,
measured by a security’s beta, is the sole source of rewarded systematic
risk in the generation of returns on financial assets. The literature over
the past three decades has however revealed key empirical anomalies within
this framework, of which two of the most prominent and persistent are the
size and value effects, reflecting the additional risk-adjusted returns to small
firms and value stocks. These effects imply either market inefficiency or a
misspecification of single-index models such as the CAPM.
This dissertation builds on the obervations of Van Rensburg and Robert-
son (2003a), who found persistent size and price-earnings effects in the cross-
section of returns on the JSE Securities Exchange, but surprisingly found
that beta had, if anything, an inverse relationship with returns. Based on
stock returns from January 1994 to October 2007, this portfolio-based study
finds support for these earlier findings, confirming that they are not sample-
specific results. However, when betas are estimated by the Dimson Aggre-
gated Coefficients method with a lead and lag of at least three months, which
is intended to compensate for the weaknesses of Ordinary Least Squares re-
gression in the face of thin trading, the relationship between beta and return
loses its statistical significance. We are however left with the conclusion that
beta has no predictive power for returns on the JSE, invalidating the CAPM,
at least as it is commonly applied, based on a market proxy of the All-Share
Index. We find further that the size premium is concentrated in the smallest
stocks on the JSE, with no significant difference in returns between the four
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Asset pricing models have a key function in financial economics, attempting
to provide parsimonious descriptions of the forces and characteristics driving
security returns. For the past 45 years, a central role has been played by
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which builds from a foundation of
mean-variance optimisation to argue that covariance with the market port-
folio constitutes the sole source of rewarded systematic risk for securities.
However, the past three decades have seen an abundance of empirical work
questioning whether this is a sufficient measure of risk, identifying anoma-
lies which cannot be reconciled with the CAPM. Two of the most persistent
anomalies in the international literature describe the additional returns to
small firms and those with indicators of value such as low price-earnings ra-
tios or high book-to-market equity ratios; these are commonly referred to
as the size and value effects, and may reflect either market inefficiency or a
misspecification of single-index models such as the CAPM (or indeed both).
Internationally, market covariance as measured by beta has continued to
have a role in multifactor models which incorporate size and value effects,
such as the Fama and French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993).
However, an important South African study by Van Rensburg and Robertson
(2003a) found that while the data indicate strong size and value effects on












with returns. This is a sufficiently surprising and important result, running
quite contrary to theory-led expectations, that it warrants further investiga-
tion. This dissertation aims to test whether these conclusions are replicated
using a later and longer data sample, as well as testing the effect of different
methodology for beta estimation, particularly to compensate for biases in
the estimation of betas induced by thin trading on small stocks.
Chapter 2 discusses the pertinent issue of market efficiency and gives an
overview of key asset pricing models employed to explain the cross-section of
returns. This is followed by a survey of the international literature on the size
and value effects in Chapters 3 and 4; exposition of the Fama and French
three-factor model, which quantifies these effects in a multifactor model,
follows in Chapter 5. South African literature is then surveyed in Chapter 6.
Methodological issues are considered in Chapter 7, and Chapter 8 outlines
the data and methodology employed in this study. Chapter 9 presents the
results of the analysis, while conclusions and suggestions for further research














The concept of rational behaviour is fundamental to all branches of eco-
nomics. Homo economicus, the prototypical rational economic man, is as-
sumed to be a utility maximiser free from systematic bias in his decision-
making. Indeed, this use of what is arguably a normative ideal as a descrip-
tive characterisation of economic agents is a key point of distinction between
economics and the other social sciences. In recent years, a significant body
of literature, loosely associated under the banner of behavioural economics,
has emerged to challenge the assumption that economic agents do in fact act
in their unbiased rational self-interest on a consistent basis. Unsurprisingly,
this school of thought has its roots in the pioneering work of academics from
other disciplines, notably psychology.
The natural consequence of a model of rational economic agents is that
markets will reach equilibrium at their optimal level, i.e. where the aggre-
gate utility gains from trade are maximised. Markets will thus tend to be
efficient, in the sense that prices reflect all information available to market
participants and abnormal profits from superior skill or insight are not pos-
sible. If this is a reasonable characterisation of economic markets in general,
it should apply most unambiguously to financial markets, where significant
volumes of information relevant to trading are publicly available, where the












the potential rewards from superior trading (and conversely, downside risks
from sub-optimal trading) are most pronounced. The notion that financial
markets are informationally efficient is encapsulated in the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis (EMH), which has three forms, differing in the information set
thought to be reflected in market prices:
1. Strong form: prices reflect all information, whether available to the
public or not. There is thus no return to additional security analysis
or even to insider trading.
2. Semi-strong form: publicly available information is fully reflected in
market prices.
3. Weak form: prices reflect only the information embodied in historical
price data.
A seminal overview of the evidence on the efficiency of markets was that
of Fama (1970), extended in Fama (1976). In the former paper, Fama re-
viewed the empirical evidence on the three forms of the EMH, concluding
that the support for the weak form is incontrovertible and that the consis-
tency of results in testing the semi-strong form is remarkable, even if the
quantity of results is not as impressive as for the weak form. As for the
strong form, Fama’s view was that there are for practical purposes only two
groups with any sort of monopolistic access to information with potential
relevance for market returns, namely exchange specialists and corporate in-
siders, and hence for the overwhelming majority of investors, the strong form
is a reasonably good approximation to reality as well. Fama concluded that
a test suggesting inefficiency must either find trading rules to outperform
the market, or take some piece of information available at a prior time and
use it to consistently identify deviations of the true expected return from the
assumed equilibrium value.
The seed was sown for the EMH with observations in the 1940s and 1950s












sense of consistent superior returns, over the long run. The formalisation of
the rational expectations hypothesis by Muth (1961), the proposition that
agents’ expectations deviate from realisations only through random variation,
and not because of systematic bias, provided the intellectual platform for a
formalisation of the EMH.
Although the term ‘efficient markets’ did not become an everyday part
of the economic lexicon until Fama (1970), much of the thinking behind
the EMH came into the public domain in the 1960s with the emergence of
the CAPM, which has its origins in Sharpe (1964). The CAPM explains
the returns on individual securities purely in terms of their covariance with
market returns, a measure of systematic risk. The intuitive rationale for this
conclusion is that the efficiency of markets allows investors to diversify away
any idiosyncratic risk associated with individual securities and hence only
systematic risk can expect to be rewarded by the market. This has been the
dominant model for the pricing of capital assets from the mid-1960s to the
present, although the CAPM has come under increasing criticism over recent
years.
The following sections give a brief overview of the CAPM and Arbitrage
Pricing Theory, another of the key asset pricing models based on the as-
sumption of efficient markets, as well as a brief discussion of alternative
views which suggest that financial markets will not necessarily be efficient.
These outlines act as a precursor to an evaluation of the body of literature
which highlights two of the major inconsistencies with the CAPM in the
time series of security returns, namely the influence of firm size (measured
by market capitalisation) and firm value indicators (such as price-earnings
ratio) on security returns. As both of these indicators are ex-ante observable,
market efficiency suggests that they should not be independently rewarded












2.1 Models of efficient markets
The single-index market model is the general form of that class of efficient
market models which has covariance with the market as its sole source of
rewarded investment risk. The market model may be written in the following
form:
ri,t = αi + βirm,t + εi,t (2.1)
where:
ri,t denotes the return on security i in time period t,
αi is the fixed component of the security-specific return,
βi is a measure of the co-movement of security i with the market portfolio,
rm,t is the return on the market portfolio in time period t, and
εi,t is the residual (or error) term, assumed normally distributed with zero
mean and constant variance.
William Sharpe’s seminal paper on the fundamentals of capital asset pric-
ing (Sharpe, 1964) is certainly one of the most influential in the history of
financial theory. Extended by the contributions of Lintner (1965), Mossin
(1966) and Black (1972), it laid the foundation for what is today widely
known as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This has been a signifi-
cant part of the edifice of finance theory for the past four decades and in spite
of numerous empirical and theoretical challenges to its foundations and im-
plications, remains a fundamental element of the armouries of many financial
market practitioners today. Building on the earlier work of Markowitz (1952),
in particular the notion of mean-variance efficiency which is the cornerstone
of Modern Portfolio Theory, Sharpe showed that with the assumptions of
homogeneous investor expectations and the introduction of a risk-free asset,
rational investors will hold a portfolio split between risky assets and the risk-












degrees of risk aversion, but that the risky asset component of that portfolio
would reflect the composition of the market portfolio (i.e. the basket of all
risky assets, in proportion to their market capitalisations) for all investors.
The key component of the CAPM, as far as asset pricing is concerned,
is the Security Market Line, which expresses the relationship between the
return on an individual security (or that of a portfolio) and the return on
the market portfolio as a function of the security’s beta only:
ri,t = rf + βi (rm,t − rf ) + εi,t (2.2)
where:
ri,t, rm,t and εi,t are as defined above,
rf is the risk-free rate of return, and
βi is the beta of security i.
Beta, defined as the covariance of the security’s return with that of the
market, standardised by dividing by the variance of the market return, can
be shown under the (admittedly limiting) CAPM conditions to be the only
measure of security risk which is of importance in determining equilibrium
pricing. The variance of an individual security’s return is irrelevant in this
context as the security-specific risk which it represents can be diversified
away by investors.
Although the EMH does not necessarily imply the CAPM, the CAPM is
often thought of as its model embodiment. In an efficient market, only undi-
versifiable risk should be expected to be rewarded in the form of additional
returns; the CAPM embodies this in the statement that beta is the only
measure of risk that is of relevance in asset pricing. It is thus not possible,
according to the CAPM, for an investor to outperform the market except













However, the literature of the past thirty years abounds with empirical
refutations of the CAPM. The size and value effects discussed in the next two
chapters are anomalies which are inconsistent with single-index models, in-
cluding the CAPM, in terms of which market covariance is the only source of
rewarded risk, and under which no other ex-ante observable indicators ought
to predict superior long-term returns. An alternative equilibrium pricing
model which is not reliant on many of the limiting assumptions of CAPM is
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), first proposed by Ross (1976). Ross makes
use of the principle of no arbitrage (also known as the Law of One Price) in
order to define the equilibrium price as a function of a set of universal fac-
tors assumed to drive returns and a corresponding set of individual security
sensitivities to those factors:
ri,t = λ0 +
k∑
j=1
λj,tBi,j + εi,t (2.3)
where:
ri,t denotes the return on security i in time period t,
λ0 denotes a common factor-insensitive return, analogous to the CAPM’s
risk-free rate,
λj,t denotes the return to factor j in time period t,
Bi,j denotes the sensitivity of security i to factor j, and
εi,t is the residual term, i.e. the return on security i in time period t not
explained by the APT model.
The APT approach is attractive in that it builds on the principle of no
arbitrage which underlies the pricing of one major category of financial assets,
namely derivatives, and that it is not reliant on the limiting assumptions of
CAPM (e.g. homogeneous expectations of all investors, and the assumption
that risk is measured only by variance, without regard to higher moments of












for factors other than market covariance to drive the generation of security
returns. It is however not prescriptive, or indeed even suggestive, as to the
identity of the factors driving returns, and it is up to the researcher to identify
these through a combination of economic theory, statistical analysis and good
fortune.
APT provides a useful framework for the development of multifactor mod-
els which incorporate the anomalies identified in Chapters 3 and 4, such as
the Fama and French three-factor model discussed in Chapter 5.
2.2 Challenges to market efficiency
The mainstream hypothesis of market efficiency is not universally supported,
however. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Richard Thaler published a se-
ries of papers in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, which have become
known as the anomaly series. These dealt with observations that are at
odds with the central tenet of market efficiency, such as seasonal effects
(Thaler, 1987a,b), cooperation between economic agents (Dawes and Thaler,
1988), inefficiency in auction outcomes (Thaler, 1988b), deviations from util-
ity maximisation motivated by considerations of fairness (Thaler, 1988a),
inefficiencies in choice over time (Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989), wage dif-
ferentials between industries (Thaler, 1989), inefficiences on currency markets
(Froot and Thaler, 1990), anomalies in the pricing of closed end mutual funds
(Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1990), irrational changes in investor preference un-
der conditions of complexity (Thaler and Tversky, 1990), mental accounting
(Thaler, 1990) and status quo bias (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991).
Much of the groundwork for this questioning, which goes beyond the ef-
ficiency of financial markets and straight to the root of homo economicus,
was laid by the ground-breaking work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tver-
sky, who pioneered the development of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Based on their observations












uncertainty and risk, Kahneman and Tversky noted numerous violations of
commonly-accepted rational economic behaviour and indeed of the axioms of
Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory. These include evidence
of preference reversals when subjects are presented with identical information
framed in different ways; limits to investor information, intelligence and pro-
cessing capability mean that it is not possible to be certain that investors will
always make decisions perfectly rationally, in a way which would facilitate
informational efficiency.
Proponents of market efficiency would however argue that evidence of
departures from individual rationality is by no means suggestive of ineffi-
ciency at the aggregate market level. Unless departures from rationality are
systematic and in a particular direction, they may cancel each other out, lead-
ing to the same efficient market outcomes as if all investors acted perfectly
rationally. Even faced with examples of precisely such systematic irrational
behaviour, the efficiency school would maintain that such irrational investors
will be driven out of the market over the long term by the arbitrage opportu-
nities they present to rational market participants; this explains the existence
of specialist money managers who act as agents for individual investors, and
who may reasonably be expected to act closer to the rational ideal than the
broad investor base.
The search for evidence in conflict with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis
therefore leads away from the examination of inefficient individual investor
behaviour, and toward the investigation of empirical anomalies which may
reflect such behaviour in price-setting on investment markets. Two recurring
threads in the literature on capital asset pricing anomalies, which has its ori-
gins in the early 1980s, relate to firm size and investment value. With regard
to the former, a substantial body of literature points to the outperformance of
smaller firms (measured by market capitalisation) compared to larger firms,
although as will be discussed below this is not a universal outcome and has
shown signs of reversing in recent years. Value effects are those linked to












value, such as book value of assets or earnings. The following chapters re-
view the international literature on each of these effects in turn, as well as
the most significant attempt in the international literature to incorporate
these observations into an asset pricing model, namely the Fama and French
three-factor model. The South African literature on size and value effects is
reviewed subsequently.
It is important, in considering these empirical anomalies and the expla-
nations advanced for them, to bear in mind what has come to be known
as the joint hypothesis problem. In effect, statistical tests in the anomaly
literature are always testing the joint hypothesis of efficient markets and the
specification of a particular pricing model, usually the CAPM. Failure to
support this joint hypothesis could therefore indicate either inefficiency or
the misspecification of the model used (or indeed both). Crucially though,














We now consider the international evidence of a systematic size effect in
stock returns, as well as rationalisations of these observations and contrary
evidence.
3.1 Evidence of the size effect
Banz (1981) first brought the size effect to prominence. He presented the
following model for returns on a security, taking account of both systematic
and idiosyncratic (specific) risk:







ri is the return on security i,
γ0 is the expected return on a zero-beta portfolio,
γ1 is the expected market risk premium,












γ2 is the specific risk premium,
σi is the standard deviation of returns on security i, and
σm is the standard devation of market returns.
Under the zero-beta version of the CAPM (Black, 1972), the parameter
γ2 is zero, as specific risk can be diversified away and should not therefore
expect to be rewarded. Banz (1981) tested this on a sample of all New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks with a listing period of at least five years
between 1926 and 1975, by sorting first into quintiles on firm size and then,
within each size quintile, sorting into quintiles on beta, thus creating 25
portfolios in all. His results indicated a significantly negative estimate of γ2,
suggesting a misspecification of the CAPM. This anomaly owes its existence
to the outperformance of small firms: Banz (1981) showed that a zero-cost
arbitrage portfolio which is long the smallest firms and short the largest
would have delivered an excess return of 1.52% per month over his sample
period. He concluded that the anomaly is more likely to be evidence of a
misspecified pricing model than of market inefficiency, and that the small firm
outperformance may very well have its roots in the lack of publicly available
information on such firms in comparison to their larger counterparts, leading
to insufficient portfolio diversification and consequently higher returns for
neglected small stocks.
Contributing to the debate in the same year, Reinganum (1981b) demon-
strated both size and value effects (the latter is dealt with in more detail in
Chapter 4). He showed that the twenty highest-ranked firms from a sample
of NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks by earnings-to-price
(a positive indicator of value) outperformed the twenty lowest-ranked signif-
icantly and consistently over time. The persistence of this effect is evidence
that it does not result simply from the informational advantages of imme-
diate action. Furthermore, the two lowest deciles by firm size were shown
to significantly outperform the market, even though the beta of these two












effects led Reinganum to the conclusion that earnings-to-price proxies for the
factors causing the size effect, and has no material impact once size has been
controlled for. Like Banz, he concluded that the persistence of the effect sug-
gests that markets are indeed informationally efficient, but that the CAPM
is misspecified.
Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1983) showed that the size effect has been
unstable over time; from January 1967 to December 1975, for example, the
correlation between firm size and return was in fact positive (but statisti-
cally insignificant), whereas over the period 1973 to 1979 it was significantly
negative. This clear nonstationarity of the size premium is a major issue for
the statistical testing of the size effect as well as any conclusions to be drawn
about its significance and reliability as an asset pricing model factor. The
authors noted that the premium should always be positive if there are fun-
damental factors (such as, for example, poorer diversification opportunities
or differential trading costs) underlying the size effect.
They did show however that for the full period of their study (1967 to
1979) there was a significant inverse linear relationship between the natural
logarithm of market capitalisation, log(MV), and excess return, adjusted for
beta. While this effect was fairly stable for the middle deciles, the assump-
tion of a non-stochastic firm size premium was clearly inappropriate for the
largest and smallest decile portfolios. Their statistical tests allowed rejection
of the hypothesis that the excess returns for these portfolios might simply
reflect variation around a constant mean. Alternative explanations, in terms
of Black’s zero-beta portfolio and an imperfect market proxy, were similarly
rejected in that they depend on implausible differential returns (for example,
a significant excess of the risk-free rate over the return on the zero-beta port-
folio). They concluded that the most likely explanation is a misspecification
of the CAPM (Brown, Kleidon and Marsh, 1983).
One of the criticisms levelled at studies of the size effect over the years
has been that the results are possibly influenced by the effects of thin trading












have been proposed to overcome this problem, notably those of Scholes and
Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979), which are discussed in section 7.4. Rein-
ganum and Smith (1983) made use of the Dimson approach for estimating
betas, and divided the stock universe under consideration into deciles by
size. Even allowing for a return of minus 100% on delisting, they found
that the three smallest deciles deliver risk-adjusted excess returns more than
two standard errors above zero. Their conclusion was that the CAPM is
misspecified, omitting a significant risk-related variable, the nature of which
they argue cannot be explained by market power or by any factor affecting
beta. The most likely underlying sources of risk for which firm size proxies
are, in their opinion, imperfect information (including the possibility of a
greater degree of insider trading in the stocks of small firms) and constraints
on investment, for example regulatory restrictions on small stock investment
by pension funds.
Lustig and Leinbach (1983) found that the smallest quintile by firm size
outperformed the largest, on a risk-adjusted basis, in six of the nine five-year
periods between 1936 and 1979. They likewise concluded that the CAPM
is most likely misspecified, with the excess return on small stocks reflect-
ing the opportunity cost of obtaining information about them. Brown and
Barry (1984) further showed that the extent of CAPM misspecification is
substantially greater for small firms than for their larger counterparts.
Reinganum (1981a) went on to evaluate whether Ross’s Arbitrage Pricing
Theory was able to do a better job of interpreting the size anomaly. In a
two-factor model, the smallest firm decile continued to show returns about
20% per annum in excess of the largest decile; given the APT methodology,
this differential is in effect risk-adjusted. Significant differentials persisted for
three-, four- and five-factor models. Reinganum (1981a) did however concede
that a difficulty of the APT methodology is that statistical tests based on it
are in effect jointly testing several hypotheses, and failure of the tests does
not definitively reveal which of these hypotheses cannot be supported.












the appropriate factor loadings on an APT model were able to explain the
size premium. Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) further developed a multifactor
pricing model with six variables: the return on the equally-weighted NYSE
index, seasonally-adjusted growth in industrial production, unanticipated in-
flation, the change in expected inflation, the differential between the long-
term government bond yield and the Treasury bill rate and the risk premium
on bonds of less than Baa quality compared to long-term government bonds.
They found a differential return between the smallest and largest quintiles
by firm size of 0.65% per annum, which they considered insignificant once
transaction costs were allowed for. Most of the excess return on smaller firms
was accounted for by the factor loading on the corporate bond risk premium.
This lent weight to the conclusion that the size effect measures the extra risk
of smaller firms. The addition of log(MV), the natural logarithm of mar-
ket capitalisation, failed to add to the explanatory power of the six-variable
model.
Reinganum (1984) however summarised all of the investigation into the
size effect as conclusive proof that empirical evidence is incontrovertibly at
odds with accepted theory, as embodied by the CAPM. From this point
onwards in the literature, the emphasis shifted from establishing the existence
of the size effect to attempting to explain it.
3.2 Rationalisations of the size effect
In a summary of the literature on the size effect up to 1983, Schwert (1983)
showed that the statistical evidence supporting the positive relationship be-
tween risk, as measured by beta under the CAPM, and return is surprisingly
weak. Although significant evidence of the existence of a size effect had been
presented, Schwert noted that a growing body of literature questioned its
financial significance, explaining it as either a statistical artefact, a purely
seasonal effect or a nonstationary process, or providing an economic rationale












discussed in this section.
3.2.1 Seasonality
One of the first and most important explanations of the size effect was in
terms of its observed seasonality. Anomalous seasonal effects of stock returns
had been noted for some time, for example in the work of French (1980) on the
so-called weekend effect, in terms of which Monday returns are consistently
negative. An application of Bayes’ Rule to any reasonable prior expectation
of stock returns on Mondays gives rise to a posterior distribution with a
negative mean, a result which is difficult to reconcile with market efficiency.
Prior to that, Rozeff and Kinney (1976) had shown that the month of January
had a significant risk premium relative to other months in a two-parameter
model.
In the case of small firms’ stocks, the excess returns in the United States
(US) appear to be concentrated in January. Keim (1983) reported that al-
most half of the size premium is owed to anomalous abnormal returns in the
first month of the year. Indeed, more than a quarter arises in the first trading
week, and 11% on the first trading day of the year. This suggests that it can-
not be accounted for by an extra risk factor term in the CAPM model, nor by
differential trading costs. Keim (1983) also noted the downward bias on the
estimation of betas by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for smaller
firms’ stocks, which are generally more thinly-traded than their larger coun-
terparts, and repeated his analysis using the Scholes and Williams (1977) and
Dimson (1979) beta estimation methods. The conclusion however remained
essentially the same. Keim (1983) further reported that the instability of
the size premiums remains after accounting for the January effect (which is
consistently positive), implying that the nonstationarity of the size premi-
ums is unlikely to explain the observed autocorrelation in excess returns. He
postulated three hypotheses to explain the January effect:












wards the end of the trading (and tax) year in order to crystallise
capital losses, and rebuy these early in January, driving prices up. Ac-
cording to Keim (1983), this ignores the arbitrage possibilities that
would present themselves to non-taxable investors; furthermore, the
level of the January effect has not varied over time with changes in the
level of personal income tax rates.
2. Differential information, with the additional return to small stocks rep-
resenting the reward to investors for the extra effort involved in re-
searching smaller firms. Keim conceded that this was a possibility, but
noted that it was untested at the time of writing.
3. Spurious causes, such as the influence of “outliers, a concentration of
listings and delistings at year-end, or data base errors” (Keim, 1983:31).
Tinic and West (1984) extended the work of Rozeff and Kinney (1976)
confirming the significance of January returns in a CAPM model, which was
apparent using both equally-weighted and value-weighted indices as market
proxies. They noted however that there is no clear benchmark as to what
constitutes a sufficient sample size for such an analysis.
The significance of the January seasonality is clear from the conclusions
of Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986), who demonstrated that for their sample,
only firm size has predictive power for returns, with neither beta (indicating
systematic risk) nor stock return variance (indicating specific risk) having
any statistical significance. However, the size effect disappears completely
once the January data is removed.
A ninety-year perspective on seasonal effects was carried out by Lakon-
ishok and Smidt (1988) who argued that there are good reasons to be skep-
tical about accepting the conclusion of demonstrable seasonal effects: a se-
lection bias in that papers challenging the status quo are more likely to be
published, the fact that nonstationarity in return generation leads to noise
which is difficult to separate from true anomalous effects, and finally the risk











which are finite and subject to random error, and hence the self-fulfilling but
ultimately spurious detection of such anomalies). Nevertheless, they showed
that the Monday, January and pre-holiday effects were very much a reality
over ninety years of US data, citing a number of possible reasons for their ex-
istence. These included inventory adjustments, timing of trades by informed
and uninformed investors respectively, tax-loss selling and ‘window-dressing’
by fund managers (selling poor-performing stocks prior to reporting on port-
folio holdings at year-end).
Several authors reported evidence on the seasonal nature of the size effect
from other countries and data sets. Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) demon-
strated a clear seasonal pattern in most major industrial nations, with a
spike typically at the turn of the tax year, lending credence to the tax-loss
selling hypothesis. Brown, Keim, Kleidon and Marsh (1983) showed an Aus-
tralian small firm premium of around 4% per month, which is constant across
months unlike the US experience, and provides some reasons to question the
tax-loss selling hypothesis. Abnormal January returns in Canada were re-
ported by Berges, McConnell and Schlarbaum (1984); however, since this
effect predates the introduction of the tax on capital gains in that country in
1973, it does not suggest that tax-loss selling is a plausible explanation. Like-
wise, Tinic, Barone-Adesi and West (1987) concluded that the persistence
of the January effect renders tax-loss selling an implausible explanation of
the observed seasonality, although for small stocks listed solely in Canada,
there is evidence of some effect on seasonality of the introduction of capital
gains tax. Kato and Schallheim (1985) showed a monotonic inverse rela-
tionship between size and excess January returns in the Japanese market,
as well as a statistically significant excess June return; they suggested that
these observed anomalies may be consistent with the Japanese practice of
paying bonuses twice annually. January and April effects in returns on the
London Stock Exchange, consistent with the tax-loss selling hypothesis given
a personal income tax year-end of 5 April and a corporate tax year-end of












Reinganum and Shapiro (1987).
The most prominent explanations of the seasonal nature of the size effect
are discussed below.
3.2.1.1 Tax-loss selling
Reinganum (1983) tested the tax-loss selling hypothesis by constructing for






Pe is the closing price of the stock on the last trading day of the year, and
Pm is the maximum price attained by the stock over the longest preceding
period permitted by the US Internal Revenue Service for purposes of classi-
fying a stock as a short-term holding (usually six months).
Reinganum (1983) divided the data set into ten deciles by firm size (mar-
ket capitalisation), each of which was further split into four by PTS measure.
Two-thirds of firms in the smallest size decile were also in the lowest PTS
quartile, with only 10% in the top PTS quartile. The Spearman rank correla-
tion coefficient between the two measures averaged 0.4. The superior January
performance of the stocks which had suffered the greatest fall in prices was
in line with the tax-loss selling hypothesis. It was further clear that a mean-
ingful size premium remained after controlling for PTS, suggesting either a
true residual size effect or a misspecified tax-loss selling indicator. Although
the null hypothesis of equal size effects in all months could be rejected at
the 5% significance level, it was also evident that the potential profits from
a small-cap trading rule were not exorbitant and may disappear altogether












Ritter (1988) put forward a variant of the tax-loss selling hypothesis which
he termed ‘parking-the-proceeds’. Based on an observation of the buying and
selling behaviour of cash account customers of Merrill Lynch over the fifteen
years from December 1970 to December 1985, he concluded that almost half
of the variation in the January effect is explained by the behaviour of individ-
ual investors, who tend to sell stocks close to the end of the year in order to
realise capital losses, and then reinvest these proceeds the following January.
This explains why the January effect is strongest following bear markets and
why it is concentrated in small stocks (which tend to form a higher proportion
of portfolio holdings for individual, as opposed to institutional, investors).
Jones, Lee and Apenbrink (1991) showed a significant change in turn-of-
the-year returns on the Cowles Commission Industrial Index following the
introduction of capital gains tax. An intraday study further revealed a clear
trend from seller-initiated trading to buyer-initiated trading around the turn
of the year (Griffiths and White, 1993), implying a systematic shift from
transactions at bid price to those at ask price. Slight differences in the day
of change in the US and Canadian markets, consistent with those countries’
respective tax year-ends, further supported the claim that tax-loss selling is
the primary cause of the observed January seasonal anomaly.
Criticism of the tax-loss selling hypothesis was levelled by Constantinides
(1984) who showed that since smaller firms typically have greater variance of
returns, the tax timing option on such stocks should be more valuable, leading
to lower pre-tax mean returns. The observed January effect is therefore
consistent with tax-loss selling only if we make the assumption of irrationality
or ignorance of investors.
In similar vein, Chan (1986) argued that if tax-loss selling were the sole
cause of year-end trade, rational sellers could repurchase stocks sold by others
at the same time. The tax-loss selling hypothesis has three testable implica-
tions: that the January effect for stocks having suffered short-term losses is
positive, that the January effect of stocks having suffered long-term losses is












By demonstrating that the second of these implications is violated, in that
stocks having suffered long-term losses produce a January effect of similar
magnitude to the short-term loss stocks, Chan (1986) concluded that tax-loss
selling cannot be a full explanation of the January seasonal effect.
Thaler (1987a) concluded from a review of the literature that while tax-
loss selling may contribute to the January effect, it cannot be the sole reason
for the observation. He further noted that the effect is not practically ex-
ploitable due to thin trading and large bid-ask spreads on small stocks.
Lakonishok and Smidt (1984) sought to explain the January effect in
terms of trading volumes. They argued that the prices of smaller stocks may
only adjust to equilibrium levels over several trading days, as a result of the
low trading volumes: the average trading volume of companies in the lowest
decile was less than 0.1% of that in the highest decile. The closing prices of
small firms’ stocks showed a bias towards bid prices until the last trading day
of the year, and then shifted towards ask prices until the fourth trading day
in January. It was however not possible to develop a trading rule to exploit
this apparent anomaly as a result of the transaction costs involved. They
concluded that most investors do not in fact adopt an aggressive tax-loss
selling strategy.
3.2.1.2 Insider trading
One alternative explanation of the seasonal effect is the greater opportunity
for insider trading in small firms, and so investors require greater returns in
January as compensation for increased risk, in that this is a time of year when
corporate insiders are likely to have access to material nonpublic information.
Seyhun (1988) showed that since there is no evidence that corporate insiders
significantly increase their purchasing activity in the financial markets in the













Typically, transactions on small-cap stocks induce proportionally greater
transaction costs, in the form of wider bid-ask spreads and higher broker
commissions. Stoll and Whaley (1983) reported that the typical bid-ask
spread and commission for a small-cap stock in a sample of NYSE common
stocks over the period from January 1955 to December 1979 were 2.93% and
3.84% respectively, compared to 0.69% and 2.02% for large-cap stocks. After
making allowance for these costs, Stoll and Whaley (1983) found that the size
effect is reversed based on monthly returns; in other words, for a one-month
holding period, large stocks outperform small stocks once transaction costs
have been taken into account. Break-even between large and small firms is
achieved when securities are held for four months, but the reduction in the
number of observations means that this result is not statistically credible.
Schultz (1983) extended the work of Stoll and Whaley by adding AMEX
stocks to the NYSE sample. However, he found that small firms earn a sig-
nificant risk-adjusted excess return even after allowing for transaction costs,
and was able to reject the hypothesis of equal risk-adjusted returns at the
1% level. He noted also that the theory that excess small firm returns are
driven by transaction costs is inconsistent with an observed variable small
firm premium, as reported by Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1983), and the
seasonal effects discussed above.
Blume and Stambaugh (1983) argued the existence of a bid-ask effect re-
sulting from the fact that closing prices can deviate from equilibrium prices
if the last transaction of the day reflects an order only from one side. By
Jensen’s inequality, this biases calculated returns upward, and is particularly
pronounced for smaller firms. This bias can be corrected by computing re-
turns on a buy-and-hold basis rather than daily rebalancing. On this basis,
the size effect is shown to be clearly nonstationary.
Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) further extended the scope by analysing
the over-the-counter (OTC) and National Association of Securities Deal-












larger sample of small firms than prior research. The small firm sample was
consequently also less biased towards those firms which had underperformed
recently. They reported a significant size effect based on a perfect nega-
tive monotonic relationship between firm size and stock price; furthermore,
as expected, the relationship between firm size and bid-ask spread is also
monotonically negative. These results suggest that transaction costs may
explain why the apparent size anomaly has not been removed by the actions
of traders.
Evidence from Australia was presented by Aitken and Ferris (1991), who
considered the effect of transaction costs on the small firm premium based
on review periods of one, two, three, four, six and twelve months, using
betas calculated by the method proposed by Scholes and Williams (1977).
Their finding was that the t-statistics for the small firm portfolio were all
insignificant at the 5% level, although they conceded that their methodology
of ‘round-trip’ costs (i.e. allowing for buying and selling costs at the beginning
and end of the holding period respectively) may have produced a bias against
finding a small firm premium.
3.2.3 Thin trading
Betas obtained by OLS regression may be subject to bias as a result of thin
trading. The fact that small firm stocks are subject to less frequent trading
implies that risk measures derived from returns over short intervals will tend
to underestimate the true risk of such stocks (Roll, 1981). Roll further showed
that the ratio of the variance of returns on an equally-weighted index to that
on a value-weighted index increases as the holding period increases (from
1.05 for daily returns to 3.166 for half-yearly). The reason for this is that
thin trading results in higher autocorrelation of returns for small firms than
for their larger counterparts.
The two primary methods of correcting for this bias are the adjustments
proposed by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979), which are












Reinganum (1982) made use of Dimson’s adjustment, regressing on lagged,
leading and contemporaneous returns, which gave rise to the expected result
that small firms are indeed riskier than large firms (the ratio of the average
beta of the smallest decile compared to that of the largest is 1.74 under the
Dimson method, compared to a less intuitive 0.77 under OLS regression).
However, Reinganum (1982) noted that for this beta differential to account
for the observed 36% per annum return differential betwen these two deciles
would require that the expected market return exceed the risk-free rate by
a quite implausible 50%. Thus, he concluded that the size effect remains a
significant anomaly.
Another interpretation of the thin trading argument is that the returns to
small firms display a liquidity premium. This is the hypothesis evaluated by
James and Edmister (1983), who found however that there is no significant
difference between the returns of portfolios consisting of the most and least
actively-traded firms. Controlling for trading activity, a significant negative
correlation between firm size and risk-adjusted returns appears to remain.
3.2.4 Market proxy
The CAPM in theory relates the return on an individual security to the
return on the universe of all tradeable securities (the market portfolio) by
way of systematic risk measured by the security’s beta. This market portfolio
is however not observable, and hence empirical testing of the CAPM requires
the use of some form of market proxy, typically an index on the stock market
from which the sample is drawn. Korkie (1986) argues that anomalies such
as the size premium are almost inevitable given a sample-inefficient index.
Berk (1995) also criticised small firm effect findings on methodological
grounds. He demonstrated mathematically that market value will in theory
be inversely correlated with realised return, even when true firm size (which
he measures by expected cashflow) is assumed to be uncorrelated to risk,
measured by expected return. In his view, analytical errors arise from the












betas are estimated with error.
The seminal paper on this topic is Roll (1977), which is discussed more
fully in Section 7.2 below.
3.2.5 Differential information
The availability of information on which to base investment decisions differs
dramatically between small and large firms, and hence the investor wishing
to invest in small-cap stocks must make additional effort in gathering the
data required to follow an informed strategy. It could be argued that the
size premium simply reflects the reward for this additional effort.
Barry and Brown (1984) used the period for which stocks had been listed
as a proxy for the quantity of information available. On the basis of standard-
ised excess returns, they found that the size effect is explained in full by the
period-of-listing effect, providing some support for an explanation of the size
premium in terms of differential information (assuming that period of listing
is a reasonable proxy for available information). Interestingly, they further
found that while the size effect is in large part due to January performance,
the period-of-listing effect persists after controlling for firm size, beta, inter-
actions between independent variables and the exclusion of January returns.
Elsewehere (Barry and Brown, 1985), they argued that securities with more
information available in fact have smaller betas under a differential informa-
tion model than they would have under the basic CAPM; if this is allowed
for, then what emerges as excess returns may simply be compensation for risk
in a well-specified model. In addition to the period of listing, they suggested
the number of observed returns and the divergence of analyst opinions as
proxies for the level of information available.
Zeghal (1984) measured the value of information provided by financial
statements by measuring the ratio of the variance of adjusted returns (rela-
tive to a comparison portfolio of firms with similar overall variance) during
the earnings announcement period compared to other times, as well as the











nificantly greater than unity for the sample as a whole, allowing a conclusion
that the information contained in financial statements has measurable value
for investors. A comparison by firm size shows that small firms’ stocks have
significantly greater ratios on both measures than larger firms’ stocks, allow-
ing a rejection of the null hypothesis of equality regardless of firm size.
On the basis that prices are more informative the more data available
about a firm and the greater the energy expended by traders on research,
Collins, Kothari and Rayburn (1987) compared earnings forecasts taking
account of market price with simple time-series forecasts. Their results con-
firmed that models taking account of price produced significantly more ac-
curate forecasts than random walk models (with or without drift) for large
firms, but the difference was insignificant for small stocks.
In related but subtly different research, Brown and Kim (1993) put for-
ward a hypothesis that the nonearnings disclosures by small firms have a
disproportionately positive bias, and are associated with positive stock price
reactions. This was motivated by prior research: Verrecchia (1982) argued
that managers have an incentive to disclose non-public information when
they expect the effects on firm value to exceed the disclosure costs. Likewise,
the incentives for information production and distribution by firm outsiders
are positively related to firm size (Atiase, 1985), hence small firms’ nonearn-
ings disclosures are more likely to be initiated by managers and to be ‘good
news’. Brown and Kim (1993) found that the evidence from the period 1982
to 1987 corroborated their hypothesis.
Freeman (1987) noted that previous research had consistently supported
two hypotheses: that abnormal returns tend to precede the announcement
of very high or low accounting earnings by several months, and that earnings
announcements tend to trigger further abnormal market activity. His study
supported the conclusion that there is a systematic difference between the
information supporting prices for large firms and that for small firms. As
corollaries to this hypothesis, it was expected that large firm security prices












and that the size of abnormal returns from earnings announcements will
be inversely related to firm size; both were corroborated by the evidence
(Freeman, 1987).
3.2.6 Price effect
An alternative explanation is that size is simply a proxy for the explanatory
variable of stock price. Kross (1985), looking at both size and value, as
measured by price-earnings (PE) ratio, effects, noted that both measures
include price as a determinant: size (market capitalisation) is the product of
price and shares outstanding, while PE ratio is, obviously, price as a multiple
of earnings. By decomposing each of these into their constituent parts, Kross
was able to demonstrate that price variation explains a greater proportion of
the variation of excess returns than either of the other variables. He found
that this continues to apply even after correction for possible biases, namely
survivorship bias, log returns and betas from the market model.
Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) investigated the effects of stock price, trans-
action costs and the bid-ask spread on the January seasonal anomaly. Their
most interesting finding was that within bands of stocks with similar prices,
returns have little or no relation to firm size, suggesting that price rather
than size is the true explanatory variable. Furthermore, the price effect is
not subject to the time variability of the size effect, reported in, for example,
Keim (1983) and Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1983).
3.2.7 Size as proxy for risk
Finally, it may be argued that size does indeed play a role, but merely because
it is a proxy for true fundamental risk. Friend and Lang (1988) performed a
multiple regression on stock returns using two independent variables: RISK
and MV. The latter is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation, while
for the former the authors used three alternative measures, namely regressed












for Stocks, which is a proprietary evaluation of the quality of stocks’ earnings
and dividends. Their finding, for a univariate regression on the RISK factor,
was that the quality rankings better explain returns than either beta or
variance. When both quality and size are regressed, the former is clearly
more important. Moreover, for several of the overlapping 25-year periods in
their study, the size premium was either negative or statistically insignificant.
Thus it is possible that in conjunction with betas regressed against market
returns, where the market portfolio used for regression purposes is very likely
an imperfect proxy for the investment universe and where the regression itself
is subject to the usual errors, firm size may simply be standing in for more
fundamental measures of risk not measured by beta.
A formal interpretation of the risk proxy argument was put forward by
Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) in terms of imperfect capital market
theory: the requirement for firms to make use of collateral when borrowing
is the result of information asymmetries between firms and lenders, and it is
consequently small firms who are most exposed to lower liquidity and higher
short-term interest rates. A recession may spark a ‘flight to quality’, in the
face of which small firms would find it significantly more difficult to raise
capital. Their empirical analysis of the conditional distribution of returns
in recession and expansion states, and in particular the significant effect of
a recession state on the risk and expected returns of small firms, tended
to confirm the hypothesis that the small firm effect is, at least in part, a
reflection of differential risk which is linked to business cycles.
Moving away from financial risk, Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) argued
that small firms have a greater exposure to production risk, and as a result
are sensitive to changes in the risk premium (which they measured as the
difference in yield between long-term government bonds and low-grade cor-
porate debt). Huberman and Kandel (1987) found that firms of similar size
tend to respond to risk factors in similar ways, with the result that their
returns tend to move in harmony.












between large and small firms can be ascribed to the fact that small firms
tend to be marginal firms, with lower returns on assets and lower interest cov-
erage, which are more likely to have cut their dividends recently. They found
the empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis for most industries.
Consequently, they constructed two return indices:
1. the difference between returns on a portfolio of stocks whose dividends
have recently been cut and those on a matching portfolio of smaller
firms, and
2. the difference between returns on a portfolio of highly leveraged stocks
and those on a matching portfolio of smaller firms.
In each case, the marginal firms are larger on average than the matching
portfolio, to prevent mistaking a marginal firm effect for a true size effect.
They found that firm size has negligible additional explanatory power once
beta and the two marginal firm effects are taken into account. Consequently,
they concluded that size is simply a proxy for distress, with the additional
return to small firms reflecting the accordant risk premium.
3.3 Evidence against the size effect
Recent studies have suggested signs of a reversal of the size effect. Bhard-
waj and Brooks (1993) reported that the period 1982 to 1986 showed results
which called into question the continued existence of a size (or price) ef-
fect. Reporting on UK experience using the Hoare-Govett Index constituent
companies (1,200 companies with market capitalisations of less than £100
million, making up the lowest 10% of the London Stock Exchange), finding
maximum likelihood estimators of time-varying betas using the Kalman fil-
ter technique, Fraser (1995) found no evidence of abnormal returns to small
firms after 1989. Based on three analyses over the period from 1980 to 1996,












spline regressions, Horowitz, Loughran and Savin (2000) concluded that the
size premium has disappeared after 1980.
It is also clear that the formation and liquidation of small-cap portfolios
to take advantage of any size effect is made more difficult by lack of liquidity
and transaction costs. Using turn-of-the-year intraday price and volume data
from the Toronto Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange, Griffiths,
Turnbull and White (1999) showed that after adjustment for these costs and
constraints, large cap stocks in fact outperform small caps by between 2.4%
and 6.5% per annum.
It has also been argued that the size effect is nothing more than a spurious
statistical inference based on data truncation (Wang, 2000). This argument
holds that small stocks are by definition more likely to face bankruptcy and
to fail to meet exchanges’ requirements for listing. There is thus an inherent
selection and survivorship bias which supports the size effect conclusion. The
survivorship bias argument, however, would seem to be easily overcome by
a data set which includes all listed firms, no matter how brief the period of
listing.
Despite the rationalisations and recent evidence of reversals, there is no
doubt that the size effect has been a significant and persistent feature of
security returns over time and across the globe, and is suggestive of either
inefficiencies in market price-setting, or the misspecification of models which
do not account for the effect of firm size (or identify underlying risk factors














Apart from the size effect, the most significant and persistent anomaly con-
sistently reported in the literature of the past thirty years is what may be
termed a value effect, where ‘value’ is typically defined as a ratio of price
to a non-market (cashflow- or accounting-based) measure of firm value. The
most common indicators are book-to-market equity or price-earnings ratios,
although these are far from the only variables which have been analysed.
Often the literature considers the size and value effects together, generally
finding that they jointly comprise a significant additional explanatory vari-
able beyond what the CAPM describes. A seminal paper by Reinganum
(1981b) showed that the 20 highest-ranking firms based on earnings yields
significantly outperform the lowest 20, and that this relative performance
persists over time, suggesting that it is not due to the informational advan-
tages of immediate action. Reinganum also found that the two lowest size
deciles outperform their larger counterparts, even though the beta of these
portfolios is roughly unity. A joint test suggested that the earnings yield
proxies for the same factors leading to the size effect, and has no material
impact after size has been controlled for. He concluded that the persistence
of the effect over time suggests that markets are indeed informationally effi-













Basu (1983) demonstrated a clear negative relationship between return
and, respectively, PE ratio and firm size. He found however that the higher
returns for small firms are accompanied by greater risk in the form of in-
creased variability of returns; this is not the case for the high earnings yield
(low PE ratio) portfolios. These results therefore suggest that the size ef-
fect is secondary to the value (earnings yield) effect, contrary to the findings
of Reinganum (1981b). Basu’s view was that both measures are probably
proxies for more fundamental explanatory factors.
The contradiction between the results of the Reinganum and Basu stud-
ies was explored further by Cook and Rozeff (1984). Using three different
portfolio formation methods, and nine different methods to measure abnor-
mal returns, they were able to show that both the size and value effects are
significant, and that neither subsumes the other.
Banz and Breen (1986) argued that the use of COMPUSTAT data for
analytical purposes introduces both ex-post selection and look-ahead biases.
The former results from the inclusion in the database of only those firms
which were viable entities at that point in time, and the exclusion of those
which had ceased to exist for whatever reason at a prior date; the latter
arises from the backdating of accounting results to their measurement dates
(e.g. financial year-end), whereas in reality such results would only have
been known several months after their measurement dates. By comparing
results for databases corrected for these two biases, the null hypothesis of no
differential in results can be rejected, suggesting that each bias is significant.
Based on the corrected data, the authors concluded that there is no value
effect independent of the size effect.
Based on a study of returns over the period 1970 to 1980, Goodman
and Peavy (1986) showed that the size effect often served as a proxy for
the price-earnings effect, but that the two factors acted independently on
occasion. They concluded that either markets are inefficient or the CAPM
is misspecified, or both.












Keim and Westerfield (1989) to investigate the size and value effects. In
their opinion, prior studies suffered from two major shortcomings. First,
an analysis of variance (ANOVA), as used by Cook and Rozeff (1984), may
reject a null hypothesis of equal mean returns even where there is no obvious
relationship between returns and the ranking variables under consideration.
Second, considering only extreme portfolios, as in Banz and Breen (1986), is
fundamentally flawed, as it ignores the intermediate information available.
Their results, spanning the period from 1951 to 1986, showed statistically
significant size and value (earnings-price) effects. However, the size coefficient
was significant only in the month of January, suggesting that it is predom-
inantly a seasonal effect, whereas the value effect was significant across all
months. The results were clearly also significant in an economic sense: hold-
ing size constant, the highest earnings-price quintile outperformed the lowest
by 3.2% per annum, and holding earnings-price constant, the smallest size
quintile outperformed the largest by 3.4% per annum.
They also noted, however, that an analysis of subperiods suggested that
the significance of the earnings-price effect is sensitive to the period in which
it is measured; a review of their results over the same subperiods as prior
studies reflected that the results of these studies were clearly sample-specific.
They further rejected the hypothesis that the size and value effects are simply
proxies for a price effect.
Wong and Lye (1990) showed that size and earnings-price effects are sig-
nificant in the Singapore market, with the Dimson (1979) beta adjustment
insufficient to change this conclusion. An interaction study suggested that
the size effect is of secondary importance to the earnings-price effect.
A comprehensive review of the earnings-price anomaly was conducted by
Ball (1992). He found that there were two broad categories of explanation,
either in terms of inefficient markets or in terms of the bias of measured
abnormal returns as estimates of economic profits. Potential sources of such
bias are information acquisition and processing costs, as well as the mises-













While Ball (1992) acknowledged that transaction costs are a potential
explanation, he argued that their magnitude is uncertain and also varies
across the universe of heterogeneous investors, with no clear indication of
which investors’ costs influence market equilibrium prices. The estimation
of investors’ returns from Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP)
data is subject to two sources of error: the recorded prices are not neces-
sarily those at which trading could take place, and they do not account for
the differential taxation between dividends and long- and short-term capital
gains. Abnormal return measures are also subject to estimation error, since
the CAPM is an abstraction with the limitations of all imperfect models.
Ball (1992) cited the following as feasible explanations of the observed
earnings-price anomaly:
1. error in the estimation of beta is correlated with earnings: he argued
however that this interpretation requires an implausible level of mises-
timation;
2. the influence of transaction costs: the magnitude of abnormal returns
is however too large for this to be a complete explanation;
3. liquidity and trading-mechanism effects, as described in Amihud and
Mendelson (1986), but again Ball concludes that the literature suggests
that this cannot fully explain the anomaly;
4. systematic understatement of the standard errors of key statistics, lead-
ing to overstated t-statistics: this would have to arise from unobserved
cross-sectional correlation or over-fitted models, both of which Ball
considered unlikely;
5. the earnings variable in fact proxying for expected returns;











7. finally, the possibility that markets are in fact inefficient: Ball considers
this a possibility, but laments that the paucity of testable theories of
market inefficiency might render efficiency practically irrefutable.
Looking at the value effect as described by book-to-market ratio, Loughran
(1997) found that realised returns on value and growth managed funds are
not materially different, and in the absence of a size effect, the value effect
is not significant. The book-to-market results reported in Fama and French
(1993) are driven largely by the smaller firms, and outside the month of
January, the effect for larger firms is practically non-existent.
An explanation of the value effect in terms of contrarian investment was
put forward by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). They contrasted
their conclusion with the view of Fama and French (1992) that value strate-
gies produce superior returns to growth strategies because value stocks are
fundamentally riskier. Using data from April 1963 to April 1990, they defined
glamour stocks as those with high recent historic growth in sales and high
expected future growth as measured by high cashflow-to-price or earnings-
price ratios, and value stocks as those with low past growth and low expected
growth into the future. They found that value stocks outperform glamour
stocks by an average 10.7% per annum, and that a strategy on both sales
growth and PE ratio yields higher returns than one based on only one of
these two variables. An analysis on the largest 50% of stocks only gave sim-
ilar results, suggesting that the results were not confounded by a size effect.
Regressions on individual variables revealed that sales growth, book-to-
market, earnings-price and cashflow-to-price all had significant explanatory
power, but firm size did not. In addition, in combination with other vari-
ables, the explanatory power of book-to-market weakened considerably. Sales
growth and cashflow-to-price were the most significant variables (Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
One possible explanation of these effects is in terms of what the authors
refer to as extrapolation theory: the notion that investors display excessive












näıvely extrapolate their expectations of future growth from historic growth.
They found that a value strategy outperforms a glamour strategy over any
five-year period, in all three-year periods apart from two, often over one year,
in three-quarters of the recessionary years and also in the market’s worst-
performing 25 months. Since the average beta of value stocks is only 0.1
higher than that of glamour stocks, and the difference in standard deviations
of returns is also relatively small, conventional measures of additional riski-
ness are powerless to explain the magnitude of the outperformance. Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) suggested several possible explanations:
investors may simply not yet have become aware of the anomaly, it could
be a manifestation of data snoooping (although they conceded that this is
unlikely since there is theory backing up the empirical results), it may reflect
the behaviour of institutional investors or it may indicate very short time
horizons of investors.
Again, it is evident that indicators of investment value have played a
prominent and enduring role in the generation of stock returns, an effect













Modelling anomalies: the Fama
and French three-factor model
The size and value effects discussed above are only anomalies in the sense
that they are incompatible with models, such as the CAPM, which ascribe
rewarded systematic risk to market covariance only. More flexible multifac-
tor models, often following Ross’ APT, allow for the incorporation of the
observed anomalies into an expanded equilibrium pricing model. The most
comprehensive attempt so far to incorporate size and value effects into a
single theoretical framework is the three-factor model developed by Eugene
Fama and Kenneth French in a series of papers in the early 1990s.
5.1 Fama and French 1992: confirming sig-
nificant factors
Fama and French (1992) attempted to synthesise prior work exposing key
anomalies which could not be explained within the CAPM framework. Using
a similar approach to that of Chan and Chen (1988), they divided the stocks
in their sample (spanning the period from 1962 to 1989 and incorporating












based on deciles from the NYSE sample. However, they noted that size and
beta are highly correlated (with a correlation coefficient of -0.988 in the Chan
and Chen study), rendering standard statistical tests unable to distinguish
between size and beta effects. The authors consequently subdivided each
size portfolio into ten portfolios based on pre-ranking betas (regressed against
returns in the 24 to 60 months prior to portfolio formation dates). They then
calculated equally-weighted portfolio returns for the year following portfolio
formation, and again estimated portfolio betas, using the full sample of post-
ranking returns for each portfolio, by regressing against the CRSP value-
weighted index of all stocks. Some thin-trading adjustment was made by
estimating betas using returns in the current and prior months; the authors
noted that the inclusion of an extra lead and lag variable in the regression
would have made an immaterial difference.
The formation of portfolios on pre-ranking betas as well as size expanded
the range of post-ranking betas and complied with the objective of producing
beta variation unrelated to firm size, allowing statistical tests to differentiate
between these two effects. Portfolios formed on size only showed a strong
negative relationship between size and average return, and a strong positive
relationship between beta and average return. Forming portfolios on pre-
ranking beta only displayed no obvious correlation between beta and return.
The two-way analysis based on the 100 portfolios formed on both beta and
size showed that beta which is uncorrelated with size is, contrary to the cen-
tral tenet of the CAPM, not compensated in average returns over the sample
period. Regressions following the methodology of Fama and MacBeth (1973)
confirmed that firm size has explanatory power for portfolio returns, but the
beta coefficient is negative and not statistically significant. They argued that
these results are not sample-specific, as an extension of the analysis period
back to 1941 (on NYSE stocks only) yielded similar results. The reliably
positive correlation of beta and market return over the period from 1941 to
1965, reported in Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth












Fama and French (1992) went on to consider other variables identified in
the literature as possibly having explanatory power for returns:
1. Book-to-market: a regression on log(BE/ME), where BE is book value
of equity and ME its market value, showed a slope coefficient of 0.5%
and a t-statistic of 5.71, even more significant than size. However, this
did not replace the size effect.
2. Leverage: two measures of leverage were considered, namely the ratio
of book assets to book equity, log(A/BE), and book assets to market
equity, log(A/ME), which surprisingly yielded conflicting results: the
latter showed positive correlation with returns, and the former nega-
tive correlation. The authors’ explanation was that it is the difference
between market and book leverage which explains average returns, but
this is of course simply the book-to-market effect.
3. Earnings-price: a statistically significant positive correlation was dis-
played, but adding size and book-to-market ratio removed its explana-
tory power.
The correlation between log(ME) [size] and log(BE/ME) [book-to-market]
is -0.26, which is not extreme and led Fama and French (1992) to conclude
that both effects are needed to explain average returns, although book-to-
market ratio is consistently the more powerful explanatory variable. They
conceded that these effects could be explained within the framework of ra-
tional, efficient markets or alternatively in terms of irrational behaviour: the
book-to-market effect may reflect the correction of earlier overreactions, for
example. However, they argued that a three-year lagged return showed no
power to explain returns, contrary to the findings of De Bondt and Thaler











5.2 Fama and French 1993: the three-factor
model
The three-factor model was fully developed in Fama and French (1993).
Building on their earlier paper, the authors expanded their analysis to in-
clude bonds, although this summary of their paper will focus on stock returns.
They followed the approach of Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), regressing
monthly returns on a market portfolio of stocks and on portfolios constructed
to mimic the size and book-to-market equity factors. This was an attempt to
compensate for the shortcomings of the CAPM in failing to account for the
explanatory power of firm size and the value effect (as measured by the book-
to-market equity ratio, or BE/ME), by incorporating these into the model
framework. Proponents of irrational markets might question the validity of
this approach, arguing that the existence of additional returns to observable
factors which are not captured in market covariance (which ought to measure
systematic risk) is evidence of market inefficiency. Fama and French (1993),
however, countered that these variables proxy for underlying risk factors,
both being demonstrably linked to economic fundamentals. Firms with high
book-to-market equity ratios tend to have low earnings on assets. They also
observed that the recession of the early 1980s turned into a prolonged spell of
poor earnings for smaller firms, whereas the earnings of large firms recovered
quickly, suggesting that firm size is associated with an underlying risk factor.
Again using breakpoints based on the NYSE sample, they broke the
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks into two size groups, small (S) and
big (B), and three book-to-market equity groups, low (L), medium (M) and
high (H), using this division to construct six portfolios. From these, they
constructed two mimicking portfolios. The portfolio SMB (small minus big)
reflects the monthly difference in returns between the average return on the
three small-stock portfolios and that on the three big-stock portfolios, while
the portfolio HML (high minus low) reflects the monthly difference in returns












the two low BE/ME portfolios; these are, in other words, the returns to a
zero-cost arbitrage portfolio which is long the small (high) portfolio and short
the big (low) portfolio.
Their excess market return RM-RF reflects the return on the value-
weighted portfolio of all stocks in the sample, less the one-month Treasury
bill rate (Fama and French, 1993:10).
The formation of 25 portfolios along size and BE/ME quintiles, as in
Fama and French (1992), confirmed the conclusion of that study that firm
size and return are negatively correlated, while a positive relationship exists
between BE/ME and return. The three-factor model presents regressions
against RM-RF, SMB and HML. The slopes on the latter two variables are
significant, confirming that the market return cannot fully explain variations
in stock returns. The results showed significantly greater R2 values than
regressions against the market factor alone.
Furthermore, the authors show that the three-factor model accounts for
the observed earnings-price anomaly fully (Fama and French, 1993:49); by
contrast, the one-factor CAPM fails to account for this apparent contribution
to average returns (Basu, 1983).
5.3 Fama and French 1995: factors proxy for
risk
Fama and French (1995) presented evidence that firm size and BE/ME are
related to profitability, providing theoretical justification for the observation
that these factors are systematically related to variations in return. They
showed that firms with high BE/ME tend to be those in persistent financial
distress, and they reiterated their earlier observation that the recession of
the early 1980s turned into a prolonged earnings slump for small firms, an
experience not shared by large firms, going on to say: “Though we have no
explanation for the small-stock depression of the 1980s, it does suggest that












factor in returns” (Fama and French, 1995:154).
5.4 Fama and French 1996: confirmation of
the three-factor model
Fama and French (1996) noted that the use of HML as an explanatory vari-
able follows the evidence of Chan and Chen (1991) that part of average
returns is attributable to a distress factor, which HML could plausibly mea-
sure. Furthermore, the three-factor model explains the mean-reverting re-
turns reported in De Bondt and Thaler (1985), since stocks with low-long
term past returns (the ‘losers’ in DeBondt and Thaler’s terminology) tend
to have strongly positive slopes on both SMB and HML, which thus predict
higher future returns.
The only anomaly left unexplained by the three-factor model is the mo-
mentum effect reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), whereby patterns
of past returns are perpetuated in the short-term future. However, the three-
factor model is a parsimonious explanation of the cross-section of stock re-
turns (Fama and French, 1996:56).
In a more general evaluation of three-factor models, the authors demon-
strated that other combinations of three portfolios describe the cross-section
of returns as well as their chosen factors (viz. market risk premium, SMB and
HML) (Fama and French, 1996:68). They argued also that the Intertem-
poral Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) of Merton (1973) provides a
valuable insight into the limitations of the CAPM as an equilibrium model.
Market equilibrium in the ICAPM reflects a market portfolio M which is a
multifactor-minimum-variance (MMV) portfolio; such portfolios have mini-
mum variance given the level of expected return and sensitivity to the state
variables. Given two state variables, returns may be described by the risk-
free rate and any combination of three MMV portfolios (Fama and French,
1996:69). However, M is almost surely not mean-variance efficient, i.e. dis-












market betas cannot be sufficient to explain expected returns (Fama and
French, 1996:74).
5.5 Explanations of the Fama and French re-
sults
There are three possible explanations for the results of Fama and French
(1992, 1993, 1996).
The first of these is that, as the authors would argue, the setting of prices
on capital asset markets is rational and can be described parsimoniously
by a three-factor model conforming to the ICAPM or the APT (Fama and
French, 1996:75). This view is supported by the excellent explanatory power
of the three-factor model, as well as the fact that other apparent anomalies
within the CAPM framework (e.g. earnings-to-price, cashflow-to-price, sales
growth and past returns) provide no further explanatory power within the
three-factor model framework (Fama and French, 1996:76).
An alternative viewpoint would be that price-setting is irrational, and it
is this reality which prevents the CAPM from providing a full explanation of
stock returns (Fama and French, 1996:75). For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1994) were of the view that the HML loading in the three-factor
model is far too high to be explained as a relative distress premium; it is in
fact so consistently positive that it all but presents an arbitrage opportunity.
However, the standard deviation of HML is sufficiently high at 13.11% per
annum to remove any arbitrage opportunities (Fama and French, 1996:79).
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) further argued that the fact that high
and low book-to-market firms have similar variances of returns supports their
contention that the relative distress premium is irrational. However, Fama
and French (1996:80) pointed out that “variance is not a sufficient statistic
for a portfolio’s risk”.
A third interpretation would be that the CAPM holds, and that the












in the three-factor model, are spurious. There are three categories into which
such arguments fall.
First, Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) argued that selection and sur-
vivorship bias in the COMPUSTAT database (resulting from the likely in-
clusion of distressed firms which survive and the likely exclusion of distressed
stocks which fail) lead to an overstatement of the average returns on the H
portfolio, and hence an overstatement of the HML loading. However, this is
contradicted by the evidence of Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995), who
showed that selection bias on COMPUSTAT is immaterial. Furthermore, the
concession of Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) that survivorship bias is an
insignificant problem for value-weighted portfolios implies that their argu-
ment cannot explain the failure of the CAPM to reconcile the value effect,
i.e. the return to the HML mimicking portfolio (Fama and French, 1996:80).
Second, several authors (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Black, 1993; MacKin-
lay, 1995) have argued that CAPM anomalies in general are the result of
data snooping, i.e. the trawling of data sets (which are by definition finite
and therefore subject to random error) in an effort to identify anomalies
which may simply be sample-specific data attributes, unlikely to be found
in different or longer samples. However, Fama and French (1996) suggested
four counter-arguments:
1. It has been shown, for example by Davis (1994) as cited in Fama and
French (1996), that the distress premium is not specific to the post-
1962 period studied in Fama and French (1992) and Fama and French
(1993); Davis found a significant correlation between book-to-market
equity and returns over the period from 1941 to 1962.
2. Similar results are observed in international studies.
3. Ball (1978), as cited in Fama and French (1996), put forward the view
that scaled versions of stock price, which includes firm size and book-












4. Given the volumes of data available, there is a limited range of oppor-
tunities for data snooping.
Finally, there is the argument that the anomalies are observed, despite
the fact that the CAPM holds, because the market proxy used in analysis
is imperfect. However, these proxies are precisely those which are used in
practical financial appplications of the CAPM (Fama and French, 1996:81);
in order to have a meaningful role as an applicable theory, the CAPM would
need to hold on the basis of an observable market proxy, failing which it
ought to make way for multifactor models which provide a better practical













Size and value effects: South
African literature
Early work examining the impact of firm size in explaining the cross-section
of returns for South African equities was inconclusive, but tended, if any-
thing, towards a rejection of market capitalisation as a significant factor in
the return-generating process. No evidence of a small firm effect was found
by De Villiers, Lowlings, Pettit and Affleck-Graves (1986); in fact, they pro-
vided evidence that larger firms outperformed small firms over the period
of their sample (1973 to 1982). The size effect was further examined by
Bradfield, Barr and Affleck-Graves (1988), who also looked at the predictive
power and role of dividend yield and liquidity, but failed to find any evidence
at odds with the CAPM. Page and Palmer (1993) likewise found no indica-
tion of a size premium on the JSE. However, Van Rensburg (2001), in his
investigation into style-based factor returns, found that there was a signifi-
cant risk-adjusted return to small firm stocks. Van Rensburg and Robertson
(2003a) attributed the lack of significant findings in earlier studies to the
small sample sizes employed and the de facto exclusion of small stocks due
to concerns about how thinly they are traded.
Evidence of the value effect in South Africa has been more uniformly












excess risk-adjusted returns to firms with high earnings yields (or low PE
ratios). Following on this research, Page (1996) found that the value effect,
measured by PE ratio, was robust not only to risk-adjustment in line with
the CAPM, but also to an APT model with as many as five factors. This was
further confirmed by Van Rensburg (2001), who found both earnings yield
and dividend yield to be significant value indicators, and proposed earnings
yield as a proxy for the value effect in a three-factor model which could
describe JSE returns parsimoniously.
In the South African context, perhaps the most important work on the
subject of size and price-to-earnings effects on the cross-section of equity
returns is that of Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a,b), based on the PhD
thesis of Robertson (2002). Building on the earlier work of Van Rensburg
(2001), which identified eleven style-based effects which contributed to the
explanation of returns on a sample of JSE industrial stocks from 1983 to
1999, Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003b) applied the multiple regression
methodology employed by Daniel and Titman (1997) to identify which style
characteristics had a significant effect on returns. They used a sample of
stocks covering the ten-year period from July 1990 to June 2000, which was
filtered for thin trading by retaining only stocks with an average daily trade
in a given month of more than 0.01% of market capitalisation. Furthermore,
the influence of outliers was limited by the winsorisation of the extreme 1%
of observations (i.e. the highest and lowest 0.5% of returns). Testing was
conducted on five measures of value, fourteen measures of future earnings
growth and bankruptcy risk, and five measures of momentum and neglect,
as follows:

















2. Measures of Future Earnings Growth and Bankruptcy Risk
(a) Sustainable growth
(b) Retention rate
(c) Size (Log of market capitalisation)
(d) Return on equity
(e) Return on assets
(f) Debt-to-cashflow
(g) Debt-to-assets







3. Measures of Momentum and Neglect
(a) Previous one month’s return
(b) Previous six months’ return
(c) Previous one year’s return
(d) Trading volume












Univariate tests identified a significant value effect on all five measures
as well as a significant size effect; none of the other variables had a signifi-
cant influence on return. Neither of these effects are anticipated within the
CAPM framework, and must therefore be viewed as anomalies within that
paradigm. It was further concluded that the two-factor APT model pro-
posed by Van Rensburg (2002), where the relevant factors are the returns on
the JSE Financial and Industrial Index and Resources Index respectively, is
similarly unsuccessful in removing these anomalies.
The authors went on to construct a multifactor model to describe the
cross-section of returns, testing the joint significance of combinations of indi-
vidually significant factors. They found that returns were best described by
a two-factor model based on the explanatory variables of market capitalisa-
tion and price-to-earnings, which “capture the central intuition behind the
international evidence of the style effects relating to value and size” (Van
Rensburg and Robertson, 2003b:10). Given the high degree of correlation
between the various measures of value, it is unsurprising that a parsimonious
model can be constructed with a single value factor in addition to the size
factor, and such a model avoids the problem of multicollinearity which would
inevitably arise with multiple value factors.
Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) went on to take a portfolio-based
approach to analysis of the size and value effects, subdividing their sample
of stocks at each month-end into quintiles by, respectively, firm size and
PE ratio (the ‘one-way sort’), and then subdividing each size quintile into
further quintiles on PE ratio, thus ending with twenty-five portfolios (the
‘two-way sort’). This latter approach allowed the measurement of the effect
of the second attribute within a particular portfolio, controlling for the first.
Once again, the problem of thin trading is handled by the application of
a thin trading filter of average daily trade in excess of 0.01% of market
capitalisation.
The most striking feature of the ‘one-way’ results was the demonstra-












PE ratio and return, in line with the international literature, while simul-
taneously, and unexpectedly, showing an equally clear inverse relationship
between market model beta and return. It was noted (Van Rensburg and
Robertson, 2003a:9) that this may be the result of thinly-traded stocks re-
maining in the data set, as betas were regressed using OLS techniques without
the adjustments suggested in, for example, Scholes and Williams (1977) or
Dimson (1979); this may give rise to estimates of beta which are downwardly
biased for small, thinly-traded stocks. The lowest beta quintile outperformed
the highest beta quintile by an average of a statistically significant 0.90% for
a one-month holding period, over the ten-year period of the study.
This surprising and somewhat counter-intuitive result raises a significant
challenge to investment theory and practice in South Africa, indicating that
beta, if it plays any role at all, is a negative predictor of stock returns. This is
a sufficiently unexpected and important observation to merit further analysis.
The ‘two-way’ results suggest that the value and size effects operate inde-
pendently of each other, and that both are necessary to explain the generation
of returns on the JSE Securities Exchange. The size effect does not proxy
for the value effect, nor vice versa (Van Rensburg and Robertson, 2003a).
An interesting extension of this work was conducted by Auret and Sin-
claire (2006), who found book-to-market equity ratio to be a better indicator
of the value premium than PE ratio, contrary to the findings of Van Rensburg
and Robertson (2003b). In fact, they found that book-to-market completely
subsumed not only PE ratio, but also firm size, in multiple regressions on
return. However, including book-to-market in a multifactor model did not re-
sult in greater explanatory power than a two-factor model using PE ratio and
size, which they put down to the high correlation between book-to-market
and other candidate variables, while PE ratio and size have the virtue for
modelling purposes of low correlation and hence a reduced multicollinearity
problem. This suggests that testing the replicability of the Van Rensburg and
Robertson (2003a) results, which is the aim of this dissertation, may reason-












respectively. Consideration of the role of book-to-market would however be
a useful extension.
Likewise, Basiewicz and Auret (2009), using both portfolio-based and
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression approaches, found book-to-market to
be a better indicator of value than PE ratio. Unlike Auret and Sinclaire
(2006), however, they found that the size effect was not subsumed by book-
to-market, which they ascribed to the prominent size premium on the JSE
Securities Exchange over the period from 2003 to 2005, a timespan not in-
cluded in the earlier work. They also found that the value effect was weakest
among the smallest firms.
The significant contribution made by Basiewicz and Auret (2009) was the
demonstration of the effects of applying restrictions on liquidity and price to
mimic constraints that would be placed on portfolios in practice. These re-
strictions, which the authors argued acted as a proxy for transaction costs,
significantly reduced the estimates of both the size and value premia, sug-
gesting that these are largely influenced by returns on stocks which would
not be included in investors’ portfolios in practice, at least not in signifi-
cant volumes. They also formed value-weighted portfolios in addition to the
equally-weighted portfolio approach which tends to be favoured in the liter-
ature, and found that size and value premium estimates tended to be lower
based on value-weighted portfolio formation.
South African evidence on the value effect is clear; while early work on
the size effect was inconclusive, recent research demonstrates its existence
unequivocally. The literature provides a solid foundation for the analysis re-
ported in this dissertation, the primary aim of which is to examine whether
the results presented by Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) are replicable
using data over a different, and longer, sample period, and whether they are
affected by the methodology employed. In particular, we wish to explore
whether the unexpected inverse relationship between beta and return which
they reported is a function of their choice of methodology for thinly-traded












traded stocks, coupled with beta estimation by OLS over periods ranging be-
tween 12 and 30 months. This study includes all stocks, but accounts for thin
trading by employing beta estimation methods (applied over the 60 months
prior to portfolio formation) designed to compensate for the downward bias
of thinly-traded stock betas estimated by OLS.
The data and methodology used in this analysis are set out in Chapter














The literature reveals numerous methodological difficulties which present
themselves with this type of analysis, the most important of which are dis-
cussed below.
7.1 Return calculation methodology
There are three major methods of calculating returns: arithmetic average of
periodic (e.g. daily) returns, buy-and-hold returns (effectively geometrically
compounded returns) and rebalanced returns (buy-and-hold returns for sub-
periods with periodic portfolio rebalancing) (Roll, 1983). Roll showed that
the buy-and-hold returns tend to increase relative to arithmetic average re-
turns the higher the cross-sectional variation of individual expected returns,
but that the reverse is true the wider the dispersion over time of unexpected
returns. Furthermore, the rebalanced mean increases with negative serial
dependence in individual unexpected returns or positive serial dependence in
portfolio returns. Scholes and Williams (1977) demonstrated that as a result
of nonsynchronous trading, the returns on individual assets tend to display
first-order negative serial dependence while diversified portfolios are more
likely to exhibit positive dependence, which leads to buy-and-hold returns












and rebalanced returns tend to rise. This serial dependence has stronger
effects for firms with lower trading volumes and less synchronous trading,
which are hallmarks of the shares of small firms. As a result, the small
firm premium tends to be less significant when the buy-and-hold method
is used, rather than arithmetic mean and rebalanced returns. This has a
major impact on the results of Reinganum (1981b), Reinganum (1981c) and
Roll (1981), all of which use arithmetic means of daily returns, and on Rein-
ganum (1982), which uses monthly and quarterly returns but based on daily
rebalancing. There is however little additional discrepancy in moving from
monthly to annual returns, so the results of Banz (1981) are sound.
This study avoids the problems of daily rebalancing by examining effective
returns over one-, three-, six- and twelve-month holding periods.
7.2 Market proxy error
Wei and Stansell (1991) considered the impacts of benchmark error, arising
from the use of an imperfect market proxy, on the size anomaly. They also
argued that betas estimated for smaller firms by OLS regression tend to be
understated, giving rise to excessive abnormal returns. The classic approach
to compensate for this is the instrumental variables technique, which gives
rise to higher betas for portfolios of small firms, suggesting that some size
effect conclusions may be partly attributable to benchmark error Wei and
Stansell (1991:364). A major advantage of the instrumental variables ap-
proach is that it is robust to the choice of market index. Discussion of robust
beta estimation follows in section 7.4.
Grauer (1999) argued that the coefficients of OLS and Generalised Least
Squares (GLS) regressions making use of near-efficient market proxy port-
folios can lead to the conclusion that the CAPM does not hold when it is
in fact true; conversely, if the CAPM is not the correct underlying model,
it is possible for such regressions to suggest it is true even when the market












the first coherently to point out that the Sharpe-Lintner market model is
essentially a mathematical truism (if we assume that mean-variance optimi-
sation is the goal of all investors). Working with ex-post sample returns,
variances and covariances, rather than ex-ante, in order to bring across that
the results are a logical implication of the efficient set mathematics rather
than a theoretical ideal, Roll (1977) demonstrated that the three hypotheses
proposed by Fama and MacBeth (1973) (viz. the linearity of the relationship
between expected security returns and their risk in an efficient portfolio, the
completeness of beta as a measure of the systematic risk of a security and
the positive relationship between risk and return) are in fact not testable,
but rather flow from the fundamentals of the mathematics governing efficient
sets. In fact, the only refutable hypothesis which Fama and MacBeth can
legitimately advance is that the market portfolio (i.e. the basket of all assets
in proportion to their market capitalisations) is ex-ante efficient. Proof of
this was put forward by Black (1972), who on the basis of the assumptions
that investors are rational (and therefore hold efficient portfolios) and have
identical expectations with regard to the probability distributions of security
returns, shows that the market portfolio must be mean-variance efficient.
This follows because the market portfolio is of course a linear combination
of all investors’ portfolios; any linear combination of efficient portfolios must
itself be efficient.
As Roll (1977) pointed out, the fundamental problem with tests of the
market model, or indeed any other asset pricing model reliant on a market
portfolio, is that we are limited in econometric applications to making use of
proxy portfolios, since the universe of all investable assets is not observable.
This makes testing very difficult: we are in effect evaluating on every occasion
a joint hypothesis of the asset pricing model in question (e.g. the CAPM)
and the hypothesis that the particular proxy portfolio used is equivalent to
the true market portfolio, consisting of all investable assets (which would
include non-observable assets such as human capital, for example) (Roll,












the two components is false if statistical tests point to rejection of the joint
hypothesis. Indeed, if there is any evidence of non-linearity of the relationship
between beta and returns, as is the case in Fama and MacBeth (1973), then
it is possible to be certain that the market proxy used is not efficient (Roll,
1977:139).
This compelling analysis leaves researchers in a quandary. If Roll’s asser-
tions are accepted, then one must accept that tests of asset pricing mod-
els based on market proxy portfolios have no statistical power to reject
the model’s theories. On the other hand, it is reasonable to ask, from a
practitioner’s perspective, what use may be attached to a theory which is
mathematically elegant but wholly unimplementable by virtue of the non-
observability of the true market portfolio. Any practical implementation of
an asset pricing model requires that the parameters or portfolios used can
be observed or estimated from market data, and it is indeed common prac-
tice for market portfolio proxies to be used. Given this requirement, this
study follows in the tradition of using a market proxy, but it should be borne
in mind that a possible explanation of the irrelevance or reduced statistical
power of the market model beta, as found in Van Rensburg and Robertson
(2003a), lies in the potential mean-variance inefficiency of the proxy used.
In South African research, where the market proxy is typically the JSE All-
Share Index (or some other broadly representative equity index), reflecting
the value of a stock exchange which is small in global terms, this possibility
is particularly relevant.
7.3 Influence of outliers
A further methodological issue relates to the degree to which outliers in-
fluence the outcomes. Knez and Ready (1997) noted that OLS and GLS
regressions are by definition sensitive to extreme observations. The applica-
tion of Least Trimmed Squares, removing 5% of observations at the extremes,












thus suggesting that the size effect is driven by outliers. The source of this
lies in the skewness of small firm returns: the sample skewness coefficient
is 1.94 for the smallest quintile. Knez and Ready (1997) argued that this
cannot be explained by either a price effect or by takeovers of smaller firms,
and that the best explanation is in terms of what they call ‘turtle eggs’, the
fact that only a handful of new firms break through as a result of favourable
conditions, and the monetary impact of this is greater for young, small firms.
Any methodology which relies heavily on the exclusion of outliers, how-
ever, seems an unsatisfactory solution. The reality of the financial markets
is that a substantial proportion of total portfolio return owes itself to these
extreme observations, and a model which ignores them, no matter how math-
ematically and econometrically elegant it may be, has the potential to be
misleading in practice. The portfolio-based approach adopted in this study
limits, but does not eliminate, the impact of individual outliers.
7.4 Beta estimation
Perhaps the most important methodological issue in the study of anomalies
within the CAPM framework, particularly in relation to the size effect, con-
cerns the estimation of betas by regression on stocks which are thinly-traded.
The CAPM is usually coupled with the assumption that security prices are
distributed lognormally (i.e. that their movements may be described by Geo-
metric Brownian Motion), with the result that returns on individual securities
and on the market index are distributed normally. If this reflects the true
underlying distribution of security returns, then the fact that trades occur
in discrete time gives rise to biased estimates of variances and covariances
of returns, and to the appearance of serial correlation and leptokurtosis in
the reported returns on individual securities. This further leads to betas es-
timated through OLS regression being asymptotically downward biased for
stocks which are either very heavily- or very thinly-traded relative to the












Kim (1997) investigated both this errors-in-variables bias which emerges
from the estimation of betas with error, and the selection bias imposed by
the backfilling procedure employed in the construction of the COMPUSTAT
database, as noted in Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995). He removed the
latter by populating missing data from Moody’s, and found that the COM-
PUSTAT selection bias does not have a material impact on the results. With
regard to the former, Kim pointed out that beta estimation by the OLS tech-
nique is biased when the cross-sectional sample size is large relative to the
time-series sample size.
After correcting for the errors-in-variables bias, Kim (1997) found that
beta has significant predictive power, even including firm size, book-to-market
ratio and earnings-price ratio in the regression. He noted that the selection of
return interval is an important consideration, as a lengthening of the return
interval is associated with both a widening of the cross-sectional spread of
betas and a narrowing of the spread of buy-and-hold returns. In a multiple
regression, neither size nor earnings-price ratio were significant; book-to-
market ratio remained significant, in part because the correlation between
beta and book-to-market was weaker than between beta and the other vari-
ables considered.
The problem of errors in variables in econometric work has the potential
to introduce bias into studies of the size effect, as smaller firms tend to have
stocks which are traded less frequently, and a downward bias in their beta es-
timation will lead to the erroneous conclusion of higher risk-adjusted returns.
Scholes and Williams (1977) proposed the following unbiased and consistent
estimate of beta to overcome the problem of nonsynchronous trading:
β̂n =










n are the OLS estimators of beta with the security return re-












preceding and succeeding periods, and
ρ̂m is the sampling estimator of the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of
the market index.
The authors showed that this is a consistent and unbiased estimator of
beta provided that the periods of nontrading are independently and identi-
cally distributed, which seems a reasonable assumption. They further noted
that nonsynchronous trading is a particular problem when estimating betas
from daily data (Scholes and Williams, 1977:309). Although it is less of an
issue when using monthly data, as is the case in this study, nevertheless it
has the potential to cause distortions given the extremely thin trading on
certain smaller JSE stocks. Importantly, it is only a consistent estimator
of beta if trading takes place in every period. Even with data at monthly
intervals, this is not the case for all JSE stocks.
An alternative approach was put forward by Dimson (1979), who pro-
posed the aggregated coefficients (AC) method, based on regressing observed
security returns on market returns in the synchronous period, as well as in
several leading and lagging periods. He showed that beta can be estimated
consistently for thinly-traded stocks by summing the slope coefficients from





where β̂i,k is the OLS estimator obtained by regressing the security return
against the market return with a lag of −k months, obtained from the fol-
lowing multiple regression:
ri,t = α̂i +
n∑
k=−n
β̂i,krm,t+k + εi,t (7.3)












time period t. The number of lead and lag terms n is variable and should be
related to the degree of thin trading in the market.
Dimson showed his measure to be more efficient than the Scholes-Williams
estimator based on UK data, and suggested that (again based on UK data)
it was appropriate to use one leading and several lagged market returns to
fully account for the effects of thin trading.
An excellent summary of the issues relating to beta estimation was pro-
vided by Bradfield (2003). He noted that consensus suggests that betas
should be estimated over a five-year period when using monthly return data,
and highlighted the theoretical need for regressing against returns on a com-
prehensive market index while noting that many believe that the South
African equity market is segmented between financial/industrial and resources
stocks, as elaborated in, for example, Van Rensburg (2002). He also dis-
cussed an important further methodological issue, namely the observed mean-
reverting tendency of betas on individual stocks, for which a Bayesian ad-
justment has been proposed by Vasicek (1973). An alternative method for
correcting for mean reversion is the two-period regression approach proposed
by Blume (1975).
Various methods for robust beta estimation were evaluated by Bowie and
Bradfield (1998), who noted that “in small samples, ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimators are sensitive to departures from normality... and hence are
inefficient” (Bowie and Bradfield, 1998:439). They examined robust estima-
tors in three classes:
1. M -estimators, or maximum likelihood estimators, which aim to min-
imise some function of the regression residuals;
2. L-estimators, which avoid the need for assuming the distribution of the
residuals; and
3. R-estimators, which estimate coefficients based only on the ranks of












They considered several regression methods within each class, and further,
for a number of the estimators, considered a ‘bounded influence’ version
which downweights extreme observations which would otherwise have undue
influence on the fitting of a regression curve. Their ultimate conclusion was
that the bounded influence Lp-norm estimator (with p a function of the
coefficient of kurtosis of the residuals from a preliminary fit) is the best-
performing of the robust estimators, displaying greater efficiency than OLS
estimation but also outperforming other estimators in the volatile market
conditions of 1987. The Lp-norm estimator belongs to the class of maximum
likelihood estimators where the residuals are assumed to conform to the Box-
Tiao distribution (Bowie and Bradfield, 1998).
The key issue relating to beta estimation in this study, which builds on
the work of Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a), seems to be the downward
bias of betas estimated by OLS for small, thinly-traded stocks; since small
stocks in their sample generated higher returns than large stocks, this would
tend to bias against finding the expected positive relationship between beta
and return. Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) partially avoided this
thorny issue by applying a thin trading filter, at the cost of the removal of a
substantial proportion of points from the data set but without (as the authors
admitted) removing the effects of thin trading from the data set entirely.
The following section gives an overview of the data used in this analysis,















Month-end closing prices, dividend yields, earnings yields, shares in issue
and monthly volume traded were obtained from I-Net Bridge (I-Net), for
each month-end from 31 December 1988 to 31 October 2007. The choice of
data source was a considered one, as the University of Cape Town (UCT)
subscribes to the services of four financial data providers. Thomson Reuters
was dismissed as an alternative as the interface to which UCT subscribes,
Reuters 3000 Xtra, does not provide access to information for stocks which
are not currently listed; any results based on a sample of currently listed
shares only would be tainted by survivorship bias. Thomson Datastream’s
database of delisted stocks was found to be incomplete when compared with
the relatively fuller offerings of both I-Net and McGregor BFA.
The major factor which told in favour of I-Net rather than McGregor BFA
was the former’s practice of revising stock history following corporate actions.
In the event of a two-for-one share split, for example, I-Net adjust all prior
share prices by a factor of 0.5 and all prior shares in issue data by a factor of
two. Consequently, accurate capital returns can be calculated by reference to
share price data, without the need to factor in the number of shares in issue.












data by examining the change in market capitalisation rather than the change
in share price, this assumes that all changes in market capitalisation accrue
to ordinary shareholders; this is not the case, for instance, where the number
of shares in issue changes because of the sale of Treasury stock on the exercise
of share options. It has been assumed that I-Net’s adjustments have been
carried out accurately, consistently and completely, although there are several
instances of changes in the number of shares in issue between month-ends
which are not accompanied by corresponding price changes, and appear too
large to be the result of Treasury stock transactions. In the absence of an
authoritative, independent data source, it was necessary to accept these data.
One significant problem with I-Net data for the purposes of economet-
ric research is their practice of retrospectively revising earnings yields once
earnings data has been released. The database earnings yield therefore accu-
rately reflects effective earnings per share as a proportion of closing price at
a point in time, but this is not the yield which would have been known to the
market at that time. This gives rise to look-ahead bias in financial research.
The methodological adjustment applied to correct for this is described in the
next section.
Appendix A sets out a summary of the number of stocks and total market
capitalisation at each month-end over the sample period.
There were numerous concerns over the quality of the data. While the
data for currently listed stocks generally appear accurate and complete, some
delisted share data are concerning. A comprehensive analysis of the data
yielded numerous anomalies and apparent inaccuracies, and Appendix B
itemises the adjustments made to the raw data.
One of the key remaining problems is the lack of information regarding
the cause of delisting. Financial research is often silent on the approach taken
to calculate returns in the period in which a stock is delisted, but a common
approach in the absence of accurate return data, at least for portfolio-based
studies such as this one, is to assume a complete loss on delisting, i.e. that a












as delistings may be the result of merger activity (in which case it is even
possible that shareholders earn a positive return in the month of delisting),
while even where such delistings stem from companies being liquidated, it
is possible that shareholders will realise some value from their holdings. If
indeed small firms are subject to greater bankruptcy risk than larger firms,
there should be greater numbers of delistings in the small firm portfolios
and consequently this assumption should (subject to the comments below)
provide a bias against detecting a size effect.
It has been suggested that the price immediately prior to delisting repre-
sents investors’ expectations of the liquidation dividend, and hence it would
be appropriate to assume a 0% return on delisting. This ignores, however,
the possibility of an improvement in outlook for the firm, accompanied by the
resumption of trading in the stock and an increase in its price. Section B.6 of
Appendix B lists four such stocks which had to be excluded from this analysis
because of the undue influence the returns generated by such recoveries had
on the equally-weighted portfolio returns. Assuming unbiased expectations,
it must therefore be the case that the recovery by shareholders conditional
on delisting is on average less than the share price prior to delisting.
In the absence of detailed delisting reason information, it is impossible
to make an accurate allowance for these outcomes. The default minus 100%
approach was therefore followed, with the analysis repeated assuming a mi-
nus 50% return for comparative purposes. As shown in Appendix C, this
change in assumption does not make a material difference to the results, in-
dicating that any differences in delisting probability between firms based on
the criteria analysed here (notably size and PE ratio) are not economically
significant. However, potential bias remains in the sample of delisted stocks
if, given that a firm delists, the probability of bankruptcy being the cause is
inversely related to firm size.
It should be noted that the data used by Robertson (2002) and Van
Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) were provided by the BARRA organisation












that the return calculations are accurate) to make such assumptions about
the return on delisting. This data source was unfortunately not available for
this study.
The data confirmed that thin trading is a significant issue on the JSE Se-
curities Exchange; some 10.4% of the data points used in portfolio formation
and return calculation indicated no trading over the month.
Month-end values for the FTSE-JSE All-Share Index (ALSI) were also
obtained from I-Net. The FTSE-JSE Africa Index series replaced the JSE
Actuaries Indices with effect from 24 June 2002, and the Total Return Index
(TRI) was retrospectively restated back to 30 June 1995. As a slightly longer
period was required for this study, returns in months prior to 30 June 1995
were calculated as the capital gain, measured by the movement of the restated
ALSI as reported by I-Net, plus one-twelfth of the ALSI dividend yield for
the month.
8.2 Methodology
The intention of this research is to establish whether the conclusions of Van
Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) are robust and generally valid. Similar
methodology was therefore applied, with several key differences aimed at
answering the following questions:
1. Are the results sample-specific?
2. What is the impact of using 60 months’ data to estimate beta, as
is considered optimal in the literature as summarised for example in
Bradfield (2003), rather than a period of 12 to 30 months?
3. What is the impact of keeping a full data set and not excluding thinly-
traded stocks, but rather using beta estimation methods which are












4. Are results obtained by analysing three-, six and twelve-month holding
period returns consistent with those from one-month returns?
5. Is further insight to be gained from the examination of intermediate
quintiles, rather than basing conclusions only on differences between
the extreme quintiles?
6. Are both the size and value effects jointly significant, and what is the
nature of their interaction?
7. Are there any other possible explanations for the observed phenomena?
The portfolio formation, return calculations and statistical testing were
coded in the free statistical software environment R (R Development Core
Team, 2009).
Security returns were estimated by calculating the capital gain and adding








where rt is a security’s return in month t, Pt is the closing share price at the
end of month t and Dt is the dividend yield at that date.
Ideally, actual dividend data would have been used, but dividend payment
dates were not available from the I-Net data. The approximation set out in
Equation 8.1 above is sufficiently accurate at portfolio level, given a spread
of financial year-ends across the calendar year.
As discussed above, delisted stocks were assumed to earn minus 100% in
the month of delisting. Comparative figures assuming a minus 50% return
are reported in Appendix C, but did not materially affect the high-level
conclusions of this study.
Betas were estimated for each stock by regressing security returns over
the preceding 60 months against market returns, as measured by movement












betas, consistent with the approach taken in Van Rensburg and Robertson
(2003a); the two beta measures are in any event very similar provided there
are no dramatic fluctuations in the risk-free rate over the estimation period.
Thinly-traded stocks were not excluded from the database, but in addition to
estimating beta by OLS, beta estimates were obtained by both the Scholes-
Williams and Dimson methods (with lead and lag of 2, 3 and 5 months in
the case of the latter).
Given that 60 months’ return data were required to estimate beta, and
that in the case of the Dimson method, security returns were regressed against
market returns lagged by up to five months, it was only possible to form
portfolios at month-ends from 31 December 1993 onwards. In view of the
structural shift in the socio-political landscape of the country, and as a con-
sequence its economy, from 1994, this is thought to be an appropriate period
for analysis. In addition, I-Net’s pre-1994 shares in issue data are incom-
plete, and hence the formation of portfolios on firm size would not have been
possible prior to 1994 using this data set. As we wished to track portfolio
returns over holding periods of up to twelve months, the last portfolio was
formed at 31 October 2006.
I-Net’s practice of retrospectively changing Earnings Per Share (EPS)
data (and related fields such as earnings yield and PE ratio) has the unfor-
tunate consequence of giving rise to look-ahead bias in econometric work,
as the PE ratios on which portfolios are formed in this study would not be
those known to the market at the respective points in time. To compensate
for this, a three-month lag was assumed between accounting and report-
ing dates, and PE ratio was consequently calculated as the price at a given
month-end divided by the implied EPS from three months prior.
At each month-end in this portfolio formation period, quintile portfolios
were formed on beta (all five methods), market capitalisation and PE ratio.
For purposes of forming portfolios on the latter, stocks with negative PE
ratios were excluded from the database. In addition to these one-way sorts,












quintile into PE ratio quintiles, and by splitting each PE ratio quintile into
size quintiles. Two sets of twenty-five portfolios were thus formed at each
month-end for each of the two-way sorts.
The returns of each portfolio were then calculated for the ensuing holding
periods considered (one, three, six and twelve months), and mean returns cal-
culated for each quintile across the sample period. The statistical significance
of the difference in mean returns between quintiles was calculated using the
form of Student’s t-test proposed by Welch (1947), which does not require
the assumption of equal population variances. This choice involves the sacri-
fice of some power, but this implies a bias against the detection of spuriously
significant relationships. A more significant loss of power is implied by the
decision to test significance using a two-tailed test, rather than one-tailed; in
other words, to test the null hypothesis against the alternative that a given
difference in mean returns is not equal to zero, as opposed to greater than
or less than zero. This decision was motivated by the desire for scientific
neutrality. It would of course be possible to conduct a one-tailed test in the
direction of the expected relationship based on theory and the literature,
but this would yield no useful outcome for a relationship between beta and
return which is the opposite of what theory suggests. Alternatively, the one-
tailed test could be based on the relationships observed in the data, but this
seems self-fulfilling and prone to accusations of data mining. The practice
employed by some researchers of using a one-tailed test if the direction of the
relationship is as expected, and a two-tailed test if not, is equivalent to an
increase of 50% in the level of significance (results shown to be significant at
the 5% level, for example, can in fact only be said with confidence to be sig-
nificant at the 7.5% level) (Nosanchuk, 1978; Abelson, 1995). The adoption
of two-tailed tests throughout therefore seems appropriate. Once again, this
choice provides an inbuilt bias against reporting statistical significance, with
the result that greater confidence may be placed in the significance of the
results reported in Chapter 9. Where the use of a one-tailed test would have













This study follows the approach taken by Van Rensburg and Robertson
(2003a) of quantifying size and value premia based on the gross unadjusted
returns of the quintile portfolios, without accounting for risk. This is theoret-
ically flawed in that it does not account for correlations between systematic
risk, as measured by beta, and the size and value measures used. For ex-
ample, if small firms tend to have higher betas, the size effect may simply
be a beta effect. The results obtained by portfolio sorts on beta, both in
Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) and in this study, however, indicate
an inverse relationship between beta and return, suggesting that any beta-
risk-adjustment would only exacerbate the size and value effects reported.














Empirical analysis: size, value
and beta effects
Results are presented below as follows: for each of the one-way sort criteria
(market capitalisation, PE ratio and each of the five measures of beta) the
average one-, three-, six- and twelve-month returns achieved over the sample
period by each of the quintile portfolios are reported. The difference in
mean returns between the first (smallest/lowest) and fifth (largest/highest)
quintiles is then examined, as well as that between intermediate quintiles
where such analysis yields further insights. A similar analysis is presented
for the two-way sorts by market capitalisation and PE ratio.
In all tables, statistical significance of the difference in mean returns be-
tween pairs of quintile portfolios is indicated as follows:
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
9.1 Firm size (market capitalisation)
Mean returns, and differences in means between selected quintiles formed












depicted graphically in Figure 9.1, which also shows the results reported for
a one-month holding period by Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) for
comparative purposes. It should however be borne in mind that these are
based on a different sample using different methodology.
As in Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a), the difference in mean re-
turns between the smallest and largest size quintiles is striking: 1.36% over
a one-month holding period, 3.05% over 3 months, 4.67% over 6 months and
10.81% over 12 months. All of these results are statistically significant at
the 5% level, with the six- and twelve-month returns being significant at
the 1% level (p-values of 0.0088 and 0.0004 respectively). Furthermore, the
three-month return differential is significant at 1% (p-value of 0.0059) using
a one-tailed rather than two-tailed test. This is very clear evidence of a per-
sistent size effect which is not merely an artefact of the sample used by Van
Rensburg and Robertson (2003a).
Figure 9.1 shows a significant drop between quintiles 1 and 2, with a
somewhat flatter graph between quintiles 2 and 5. This suggests that it
would be instructive to consider differences between the mean returns of
these intermediate quintiles, and the statistical significance thereof. Table
9.1 indicates that the difference between the mean returns of quintiles 1 and
2 is positive and significant at the 5% level for all holding periods considered,
and indeed at the 1% level for three- and six-month holding periods (use of
a one-tailed test further renders the twelve-month differential significant at
the 1% level). By contrast, the difference in returns between quintiles 2
and 5 is not significantly different from zero at the 10% level for any of the
holding periods. This indicates that the size effect is primarily a function of
excess return to the smallest quintile of stocks in the FTSE-JSE All-Share
Index universe. Any attempt to build an equilibrium pricing model using
market capitalisation as one of the factors is consequently unlikely to yield
reasonable results unless the factor has a binary quality: it does not appear
to be a factor which is rewarded progressively across the entire stock universe.












Table 9.1: Results for portfolios formed on market capitalisation
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 2.52% 6.59% 11.76% 24.68%
2 1.13% 3.30% 6.63% 16.34%
3 1.34% 3.97% 8.43% 16.84%
4 0.91% 3.22% 6.37% 14.13%
5 1.16% 3.53% 7.09% 13.87%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 1.36% ** 3.05% ** 4.67% *** 10.81% ***
1-2 1.39% ** 3.29% *** 5.13% *** 8.34% **
2-5 -0.03% -0.23% -0.46% 2.47%












vation of Basiewicz and Auret (2009) that estimates of the size premium are
much reduced once price or liquidity filters are applied. Since it would be ex-
pected that many of the smallest stocks would be those with the lowest share
prices, as well as lowest trading volumes, the size premium observed in this
study may likewise be removed or significantly reduced if the lowest-priced
or least-traded stocks were screened out of the universe under consideration.
This suggests that the size effect may reflect a premium for illiquidity, or a
market inefficiency caused by constraints on institutional investment.
9.1.1 Does the size effect proxy for risk?
One of the possible explanations of the size effect is that it reflects the re-
ward for bankruptcy risk; this is the position adopted by, for example, Chan,
Chen and Hsieh (1985), Fama and French (1995) and Perez-Quiros and Tim-
mermann (2000). Such risk ought over time to be reflected in the statistical
properties of the returns of small firm portfolios. Given that the CAPM is
rooted in a mean-variance framework, and that the size effect does not ap-
pear to be captured by the CAPM beta, we may perhaps expect this risk to
be reflected in higher moments of the return distribution, notably skewness
and kurtosis.
In the figures below, the standard deviation, skewness and excess kurtosis
of the size quintile portfolio returns have been calculated as the unbiased
estimates of the population moments.
Figure 9.2 shows the standard deviation of the quintile portfolio returns.
With the exception of the returns over twelve-month holding periods,
there is little apparent difference between the standard deviations of returns
in quintile portfolios 1 and 2, or indeed between any pair of quintile portfolios.
The p-values of the F -test for differences in variance between portfolios 1 and
2 are in excess of 0.84 for the one-, three- and six-month holding periods. This
is consistent with the expectation that if the size effect is not encapsulated
within beta, it is likely to show up in moments higher than the second, if












Figure 9.2: Standard deviation of size quintile portfolio returns
The skewness of returns in the quintile portfolios is depicted in Figure
9.3.
Figure 9.3: Skewness of size quintile portfolio returns
Once again, we cannot draw any meaningful conclusions from this figure.
The returns for quintile 1 are uniformly positively skewed, and the degree of
skewness appears to increase with the length of the holding period. Returns
for quintile 2 exhibit close to zero skewness for all holding periods, while
those of quintiles 3 to 5 are negatively skewed. A priori, we may expect












level, positive skewness (characterised by consistent low returns punctuated
by several very high returns) would tend to be preferred to negative skewness,
in which the shocks are on the downside. However, much of the positive
skewness of small firm returns is likely to be due to the fact that very few
small firms break through to become established, successful operations, and
there is risk involved in small stock investment because of the need to identify
these stocks. It should be noted though that the results of this study indicate
that much of this risk can be mitigated by a diversified small stock portfolio
holding; this does however ignore transaction costs and liquidity constraints.
Figure 9.4 shows the excess kurtosis of the size portfolio returns.
Figure 9.4: Excess kurtosis of size quintile portfolio returns
This evidence is inconclusive. The returns of the smallest quintile do not
appear to be systematically more leptokurtic than those of the other quintile
portfolios. With the exception of quintiles 3 and 5 for the twelve-month
holding period, all portfolio returns display excess kurtosis, as is typical of
equity returns. It is worth noting however that these results may stem in
part from the assumption of complete loss on delisting for all stocks. If there
is a systematic difference in delisting returns between small and large stocks,
then it is possible that the kurtosis of the larger quintiles is overstated in
this analysis. There is however no way to compensate for this within the












that prior to the removal of four stocks with single-month returns in excess
of 900%, discussed in section B.6 of Appendix B, the kurtosis of the smallest
quintile was notably higher than the others. This was clearly however an
artefact of the extreme returns from these penny stocks.
It is consequently not clear, at least from the statistical properties of
small stock returns, that the size effect is unequivocally compensation for
increased risk.
9.1.2 Trends and seasonality of the size premium
Figure 9.5 shows the size premium, measured as the difference in one-month
holding period returns between extreme size quintiles for each month of the
portfolio formation period of the sample, as well as the six-month moving
average of the size premium and a linear trendline fitted through its points.
Figure 9.5: Trends in the size premium over time (one-month holding period)
While this figure indicates the volatility of the size premium, it also pro-
vides tentative evidence of it shrinking over time, with a clearly downward












historically has in part represented market inefficiency, presenting a statisti-
cal arbitrage opportunity which has been closed out over time by the partici-
pation of greater expertise in South African financial markets, increased asset
management competition and access to quicker and more accurate informa-
tion thanks to the advance of technology. However, the fitting of a simple
linear model to such a noisy, volatile time series may not be appropriate, and
is influenced by the starting and ending point. If we conclude that the size
premium is disappearing, we must do so with caution.
Figure 9.6 shows the average size premium by month over the period of
analysis. The only notable feature is the gradual increase in the premium over
the year to September, with a subsequent rapid decline in the final quarter
of the calendar year. With only twelve or thirteen observations per calendar
month, it is difficult to have confidence in the reliability of these results or to
read too much into them. Certainly, given South Africa’s February tax-year-
end, these results are not capable of explanation in terms of tax-loss selling
behaviour of investors as discussed in section 3.2.1 above.












9.2 Value (price-earnings ratio)
Mean returns, and differences in means between selected quintiles formed on
PE ratio, are set out in Table 9.2. The mean returns are depicted graphically
in Figure 9.7. Again the one-month holding period mean returns reported
by Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) are shown for comparison.
Table 9.2: Results for portfolios formed on PE ratio
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 2.43% 5.55% 8.91% 16.82%
2 1.40% 4.76% 10.09% 20.83%
3 1.48% 4.23% 8.15% 19.33%
4 1.04% 3.50% 7.08% 15.75%
5 0.72% 2.59% 6.08% 13.26%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 1.71% *** 2.96% *** 2.82% * 3.55%
1-3 0.94% 1.32% 0.76% -2.51%
3-5 0.77% 1.64% 2.07% 6.06% **
Looking at the difference in returns between extreme quintiles, it is clear
that PE ratio is a statistically significant predictor of excess return at the
1% level for one- and three-month holding periods. The evidence over longer
holding periods is however less conclusive: the difference in mean returns is
significant only at the 10% level for a six-month holding period (significant
at 5% based on a one-tailed test) and is not significant for a twelve-month
holding period (p-value of 0.1700 based on the two-tailed test).
Figure 9.7 indicates a much smoother downward progression of returns
as PE ratio increases than was the case for portfolios formed on market cap-
italisation, suggesting that PE ratio is a factor which could be incorporated












Figure 9.7: Mean returns by quintiles formed on PE ratio
returns between quintiles 1 and 3 are statistically significant, although the
one-month holding period differential is significant at the 10% level using a
one-tailed test. Of the differences between quintiles 3 and 5, only the twelve-
month holding period displays significance (at the 5% level); one-tailed tests
however indicate significance at the 10% level for both one- and three-month
holding periods.
An interesting feature is that as the holding period increases, the excess
return on the lowest PE ratio quintile seems to disappear, to the extent
that quintile 1 in fact earns a lower return than quintile 2 over six- and














9.3.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
Mean returns, and differences in means between selected quintiles formed on
OLS beta, are set out in Table 9.3. The mean returns are depicted graphically
in Figure 9.8, again showing the comparative Van Rensburg and Robertson
(2003a) one-month holding period returns.
Table 9.3: Results for portfolios formed on OLS beta
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 1.82% 5.07% 9.36% 19.40%
2 1.60% 4.88% 10.14% 22.37%
3 1.45% 4.42% 8.76% 18.87%
4 1.52% 4.32% 8.37% 17.40%
5 0.68% 1.95% 3.71% 7.94%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 1.13% * 3.11% *** 5.64% *** 11.46% ***
1-4 0.30% 0.74% 0.99% 2.00%
4-5 0.83% 2.37% * 4.66% ** 9.46% ***
Figure 9.8 indicates a general inverse relationship between beta estimated
by OLS and portfolio return. This is consistent with the observations of Van
Rensburg and Robertson (2003a), despite differences in the sample period
and methodology. The difference in returns between extreme quintiles is sig-
nificant only at the 10% level for a one-month holding period (5% using a
one-tailed test), but is significant at the 1% level for all other holding peri-
ods. A noteworthy feature is that this excess return appears to be generated
largely by a low return in quintile 5, the portfolio of stocks with the highest












Figure 9.8: Mean returns by quintiles formed on OLS beta
cally significant for any holding period, but are between quintiles 4 and 5.
However, the shortcomings of OLS regression in the face of thin trading sug-
gest that alternative beta estimation techniques should be considered before
attempting to draw conclusions from these results.
9.3.2 Scholes-Williams
Mean returns, and differences in means between selected quintiles formed
on Scholes-Williams beta, are set out in Table 9.4. The mean returns are
depicted graphically in Figure 9.9.
It might be expected that, if indeed thin trading and the consequent prob-
lems of robust beta estimation are contributors to the somewhat surprising
results reported by Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a), the inverse rela-
tionship between return and beta estimated by the Scholes-Williams method












Table 9.4: Results for portfolios formed on Scholes-Williams beta
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 2.08% 5.98% 11.56% 25.57%
2 1.49% 4.19% 8.58% 19.10%
3 1.52% 4.28% 8.06% 17.31%
4 1.09% 3.55% 6.89% 12.16%
5 0.89% 2.63% 5.21% 11.77%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 1.19% ** 3.35% *** 6.35% *** 13.79% ***
1-2 0.59% 1.79% * 2.98% * 6.47% **
2-5 0.60% 1.56% 3.36% * 7.32% ***












mated by OLS. The results however indicate that it is even more pronounced.
The difference in return between extreme quintiles is significant at the 5%
level for a one-month holding period, and at the 1% level for longer holding
periods.
One possible explanation is that the earlier observations are not a function
of thinly-traded stocks at all. However, it must be noted, as pointed out
in section 7.4 above, that the Scholes-Williams method requires trading in
every period for consistency. This is not the case on the JSE Securities
Exchange; some 10.4% of data points used in portfolio formation and return
calculation in this study indicate no evidence of trading in the preceding
month. The Scholes-Williams method is therefore unlikely to be appropriate
for beta estimation on the JSE, and we must look to the Dimson Aggregated
Coefficients method for further guidance on whether the use of methodology
designed specifically to compensate for thin trading could explain, in part or
in full, the observed inverse relationship between beta and return.
9.3.3 Dimson (lead and lag 2 months)
Mean returns, and differences in means between selected quintiles formed on
Dimson beta with a lead and lag of 2 months, are set out in Table 9.5. The
mean returns are depicted graphically in Figure 9.10.
Differences between the returns of extreme quintiles are significant at the
10% level for a three-month holding period, at the 5% level for a six-month
holding period, and at 1% when considering returns over twelve months.
None of the differences in mean returns between quintiles 1 and 3 are sta-
tistically significant, while the difference between quintiles 3 and 5 is signif-
icant only for a twelve-month holding period. While slightly more muted
than the Scholes-Williams method (the twelve-month differential, for exam-
ple, is 9.82%, as opposed to 13.79% above), portfolios formed on a Dimson
beta estimated with a lead and lag of 2 months again display evidence of
an inverse relationship between beta and return, although only for six- and












tistically significant at the 5% level. Given the extent of thin trading on the
JSE Securities Exchange, however, it would be instructive to consider Dimson
betas estimated with a longer lead and lag.
Table 9.5: Results for portfolios formed on Dimson beta (lead/lag 2 months)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 1.72% 5.08% 9.86% 21.69%
2 1.34% 4.30% 8.76% 18.38%
3 1.55% 4.05% 8.05% 18.07%
4 1.41% 4.21% 7.83% 15.95%
5 1.05% 2.99% 5.82% 11.87%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 0.68% 2.09% * 4.04% ** 9.82% ***
1-3 0.17% 1.03% 1.81% 3.62%
3-5 0.50% 1.06% 2.23% 6.20% **
9.3.4 Dimson (lead and lag 3 months)
Mean returns, and differences in means between selected quintiles formed on
Dimson beta with a lead and lag of 3 months, are set out in Table 9.6. The
mean returns are depicted graphically in Figure 9.11.
When the lead and lag period for Dimson beta estimation is extended to
3 months, the difference in return between extreme quintiles is statistically
significant only for the twelve-month holding period (p-value of 0.0311). This
suggests that, to some extent, the observed inverse relationship between beta
and return in Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) could owe its existence,
at least in part, to the weaknesses of OLS estimation of beta for thinly-












Figure 9.10: Mean returns by quintiles formed on 2 month Dimson beta
would have remained in their universe which are sufficiently thinly-traded
for OLS estimation to have been problematic, as conceded by the authors).
It is important to note, however, that application of the Dimson Aggregated
Coefficients methodology removes only statistical significance from these re-
sults; it does not actually reverse the observed inverse relationship between
beta and return. It is permissible to conclude from these results that beta has
no role to play in the generation of returns on the JSE Securities Exchange,
but there is certainly no evidence of the positive relationship which theory
would suggest.
9.3.5 Dimson (lead and lag 5 months)
Mean returns, and differences in means between selected quintiles formed on
Dimson beta with a lead and lag of 5 months, are set out in Table 9.7. The












Table 9.6: Results for portfolios formed on Dimson beta (lead/lag 3 months)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 1.52% 4.23% 8.28% 19.73%
2 1.51% 4.45% 8.61% 18.45%
3 1.27% 4.11% 8.37% 16.81%
4 1.43% 4.10% 8.12% 17.92%
5 1.34% 3.75% 6.93% 13.05%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 0.18% 0.48% 1.35% 6.68% **
1-3 0.25% 0.12% -0.09% 2.91%
3-5 -0.07% 0.36% 1.44% 3.77%












Table 9.7: Results for portfolios formed on Dimson beta (lead/lag 5 months)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 1.68% 4.66% 8.65% 18.02%
2 1.42% 4.50% 9.40% 20.81%
3 1.38% 3.77% 7.81% 17.85%
4 1.64% 4.49% 8.29% 16.80%
5 0.95% 3.22% 6.18% 12.51%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 0.73% 1.44% 2.46% 5.51% **
1-3 0.30% 0.89% 0.84% 0.17%
3-5 0.43% 0.55% 1.63% 5.34% *












Extending the lead and lag to 5 months does not appear to fundamen-
tally alter the conclusions reached with a lead and lag of 3 months. Once
again, only the twelve-month holding period return differential is statistically
significant at the 5% level (p-value of 0.0493). We may conclude from these
results that there is little advantage to be gained from the Dimson method-
ology with lead and lag longer than 3 months, which appears sufficient to
compensate for the degree of thin trading in evidence on the JSE Securities
Exchange. We remain with the conclusion that beta appears to have an in-
verse relationship with return, but that by and large this relationship is not
statistically significant. In a nutshell, beta appears to be irrelevant; it has
no predictive power for returns on South African equities.
9.4 Two-way analysis: size and value
Two-way analyses were conducted by splitting quintile portfolios formed on,
respectively, market capitalisation and PE ratio into further quintiles on PE
ratio and market capitalisation respectively, thus resulting in 25 portfolios
for each two-way analysis. This allows us to analyse the effect of one factor
while keeping the other constant.
Typically, the logarithmic transformation of market capitalisation and
PE ratio would be the operational variables used in a multifactor model; the
correlation coefficients between these was 0.3368, indicating some positive
relationship but not sufficiently high to suggest that one may proxy for the
other.
9.4.1 Value within size
Figure 9.13 shows the return in each of the 25 portfolios where quintiles are
formed first on market capitalisation and then, within these, on PE ratio.
Table 9.8 shows the difference in mean returns between extreme PE ratio












Figure 9.13: Two-way analysis: value within size quintiles
Table 9.8: Difference in returns between extreme PE ratio quintiles within
size quintiles
Holding period
Size quintile 1 3 6 12
1 0.41% -2.62% -7.22% ** -17.39% ***
2 0.98% 1.79% 2.40% 1.00%
3 1.63% * 4.01% ** 4.82% ** 8.59% **
4 1.38% * 3.99% *** 7.52% *** 11.55% ***











Within the intermediate size quintiles 3 and 4, PE ratio appears to have
strong predictive power for returns. This is not however the case for quintiles
2 and 5, where the returns to low PE ratio are positive but not statistically
significant across the holding periods considered. The most interesting result
is in the smallest size quintile, which the one-way analysis showed to be the
source of almost all of the excess return to firm size. Here the excess return
to low PE ratio is in fact negative for holding periods longer than one month,
significantly so for six- and twelve-month holding periods.
With the exception of quintile 5, these returns are consistent with those
reported by Basiewicz and Auret (2009). They are suggestive of a size effect
which dominates for the smallest quintile of firms, and a PE ratio effect which
explains more of the variation in returns between larger firms.
9.4.2 Size within value
Figure 9.14 shows the return in each of the 25 portfolios where quintiles are
formed first on PE ratio and then, within these, on firm size. Table 9.9 shows
the difference in mean returns between extreme size quintiles within each PE
ratio quintile.
Table 9.9: Difference in returns between extreme size quintiles within PE
ratio quintiles
Holding period
PE quintile 1 3 6 12
1 2.95% *** 4.03% ** 2.37% 2.00%
2 -0.28% 0.48% 2.42% 9.50% **
3 0.35% 0.08% 0.34% 10.51% *
4 0.49% 1.21% 3.99% * 12.41% ***
5 0.80% 3.06% * 6.03% ** 12.69% ***












Figure 9.14: Two-way analysis: size within value quintiles
pronounced as the holding period increases. Interestingly, this is not the case
for the smallest PE ratio quintile, where the one- and three-month holding
period differentials are statistically significant, but the significance disappears
for longer holding periods.
It therefore appears that both size and value effects are needed to explain
returns on the JSE Securities Exchange, and that one does not proxy for the
other.
9.5 Explanation of the results
We consider below two possible explanations for the unexpected relationship













9.5.1 Market segmentation and market proxy error
One of the major criticisms of empirical work indicating anomalies within
the CAPM framework is that they, of necessity, use market proxies which
are narrower than the universe of all risky assets. This is an especially
pronounced issue in a relatively small economy such as South Africa. The
work of Van Rensburg (2002) suggested that the JSE All-Share Index is
very probably mean-variance inefficient in a global context, and found that a
two-factor APT model decomposing the JSE Securities Exchange into Finan-
cial/Industrial and Resources components was more successful in describing
the cross-section of returns than the single-factor CAPM.
Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) considered this possibility by re-
peating their study on a sub-sample of Financial and Industrial stocks, with
betas estimated by regression against the Financial and Industrial Index
(Findi) returns (the sample of Resources stocks was too small to perform
a comparable study). They found little material difference in results when
compared to the sample of all stocks. This suggests that there is little to be
gained from attempting to extend the analysis presented in this dissertation
to betas from the two-factor APT model. This viewpoint was confirmed by
Professor Paul van Rensburg in verbal feedback given at a seminar present-
ing preliminary results of this study at the University of Cape Town on 12
August 2009.
9.5.2 Mean reversion and momentum
One characteristic of an efficient market is that returns should not display
systematic under- or overreaction to news, with the result that return pat-
terns ought not to show signs of momentum effects, in which the patterns
of past returns continue into the future, or mean reversion, in which past
patterns are reversed. There is however ample evidence of both on global
markets. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) showed that stocks which had out-












twelve months) tended to continue to outperform over the following three to
twelve months, and that these results could not be ascribed to systematic
risk in the form of stocks’ betas. Quite the opposite effect was detected by
De Bondt and Thaler (1985), who looked at returns over longer holding pe-
riods of three and five years, and found that the ‘loser’ portfolio of the 35
stocks with the lowest returns over the preceding three or five years convinc-
ingly outperformed the ‘winner’ portfolio consisting of the 35 stocks with
the highest returns over that preceding period. Mean reversion on the South
African market has also been reported by Cubbin, Eidne, Firer and Gilbert
(2006), although it should be noted that their portfolios were formed on PE
ratio rather than past return (the two measures are expected to be positively
correlated, however).
This mean reversion effect is a possible explanation for the results ob-
served. In a generally up-trending market, it is plausible that the stocks
with the highest returns over the past five years will tend to be those with
the highest estimated betas; if mean reversion is present in the market to the
extent that these stocks tend to underperform going forward, then this would
account to a large degree for the observed inverse relationship between beta
and return. This hypothesis was therefore investigated, albeit with little ex-
pectation of confirmation, given that the holding periods considered in this
study (up to 12 months) are considerably shorter than those considered in
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and other prominent work on mean reversion.
Quintile portfolios were formed on return over the previous 60 months,
in the same way as they were formed on size, PE ratio and beta above.
Figure 9.15 depicts graphically the mean quintile portfolio returns over each
of the four holding periods considered, while Table 9.10 gives the information
in tabular format while also considering the difference in returns between
extreme quintiles, as well as between intermediate quintiles.
There is little that can be concluded from these results. While there is
some indication of an inverse relationship between past and future return












Table 9.10: Results for portfolios formed on preceding 60 months’ return
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 2.00% 4.82% 8.63% 18.97%
2 1.63% 4.84% 8.99% 17.41%
3 1.25% 3.53% 6.46% 14.72%
4 0.91% 3.48% 8.01% 17.56%
5 1.27% 3.97% 8.23% 17.24%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 0.73% 0.86% 0.39% 1.72%
1-3 0.76% 1.30% 2.17% 4.24%
3-5 -0.02% -0.44% -1.78% -2.52%













significant. Furthermore, the relationship appears to be reversed between
quintiles 3 and 5, where there typically seems to be a positive relationship
between past and future return, although again these differences are not
statistically significant. We may thus conclude that mean reversion is not
a significant cause of the observed inverse relationship between beta and
return.
It was also considered worthwhile to examine momentum effects, and for
this reason portfolios were formed based on the past 12 months’ return. Table
9.11 and Figure 9.16 present these results.
Table 9.11: Results for portfolios formed on preceding 12 months’ return
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 1.28% 2.46% 3.88% 11.27%
2 1.18% 3.95% 7.05% 14.60%
3 1.37% 4.12% 8.48% 17.21%
4 1.35% 4.05% 8.38% 17.65%
5 1.91% 6.12% 12.66% 25.39%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 -0.63% -3.66% *** -8.78% *** -14.12% ***
1-4 -0.07% -1.59% -4.50% ** -6.38% **
4-5 -0.56% -2.07% -4.28% ** -7.74% ***
Clear evidence emerges of a momentum effect on the JSE Securities Ex-
change. While the difference in return between extreme quintiles is not sig-
nificant for a one-month holding period, it is significant at the 1% level for all
longer holding periods. Furthermore, half or more of this difference is con-
centrated in the fifth quintile, indicating that it is those stocks which have
performed best over the preceding year which tend to perform best over the












Figure 9.16: Mean returns by quintiles formed on preceding 12 months’ re-
turn
in a multifactor model describing JSE returns. A multiple regression may
however show that it is subsumed by the explanatory variables of size and
value (PE ratio).
Chapter 10 summarises the salient features of the findings presented in













Conclusions and suggestions for
further research
The size effect and value effect (based on the PE ratio) on the JSE Securities
Exchange are confirmed by the results of this study. These effects are signif-
icant and pervasive, and either indicative of some level of market inefficiency
or, perhaps more likely, a misspecification of equilibrium pricing models such
as the CAPM which assume that market covariance alone constitutes re-
warded systematic risk. There is some tentative evidence of a reduction in
the size premium over time, but this is not conclusive.
The most surprising observation of Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a),
namely that beta has, if anything, an inverse relationship with return, also
finds support in this study. Their conclusion is clearly not sample-specific, as
this analysis covers a later and longer period, and nor is it a result of the short
(12 to 30 month) period used for beta estimation, as betas estimated over
a 60 month period lead to a similar result. The outcome is however robbed
of its statistical significance when betas are estimated using the Dimson
Aggregated Coefficients method, designed specifically to compensate for the
effects of thin trading and the consequent shortcomings of OLS estimation,
using a lead and lag period of at least three months. We may however at












Securities Exchange is concerned, at least based on the (possibly inefficient)
market proxy of the FTSE-JSE All-Share Index; there is no support for the
positive relationship espoused by finance theory.
Analysis of intermediate quintile portfolios yields further interesting in-
sights. While the value effect appears to apply across the stock universe, with
return a monotonically decreasing function of PE ratio, the size effect seems
to be concentrated in the smallest quintile of stocks, with little difference
in returns between the largest four quintiles. Any attempt to build these
observations into a multifactor model would need to recognise this feature of
the size premium.
The size and value effects appear furthermore to operate independently,
given correlation between the market capitalisation and PE ratio measures
which is not excessive, as well as variation within sub-quintiles in the two-
way analyses presented in sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 above. The value (size)
effects are however not uniform over the size (value) quintiles, and again these
features would need to be recognised in any sensible multifactor model.
These size and value effects may indicate market inefficiency, and the di-
minishing size premium over this study’s sample period would be consistent
with the rational actions of market participants closing out historic inefficien-
cies. It is however perhaps more likely that they reflect sources of risk which
are not measured by market covariance, and hence point to a misspecifica-
tion of the CAPM and the need for more sophisticated multifactor models
to represent the returns on South African equities.
It should be noted that this study takes no account of transaction costs.
While many of the results presented in this dissertation are highly statisti-
cally significant, their economic significance may be nil if transaction costs
prevent trading strategies from taking advantage of them. The incorporation
of transaction costs would be a useful extension to this research.
The formation of value-weighted rather than equally-weighted portfolios
may also provide some insight. This approach would obviate the need for












on portfolio returns. That being said, the reliability of the data used in this
study, particularly for delisted stocks, is subject to question. Appendix B
describes the adjustments made to the raw data, the extent of which suggests
that there may well be more undetected data inaccuracies. The consistency
of data adjustment for corporate actions and capital events is also ques-
tionable. Presumably financial researchers across South Africa grapple with
the same issues, and consideration ought to be given by finance academics
to the (admittedly onerous) collaborative development of a reliable historic
equity market data set which can then be maintained with comparatively
little effort, along the lines of the database maintained by the University of
Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
As this study has built primarily on the work of Van Rensburg and
Robertson (2003a), PE ratio has been used as the value indicator. In view
of the later findings of Auret and Sinclaire (2006) and Basiewicz and Au-
ret (2009), it would be useful to consider book-to-market as an alternative
value indicator, particularly in a regression-based extension of this research.
The application of price and liquidity constraints, following the example of
Basiewicz and Auret (2009), would also be a worthwhile avenue for further
investigation. Similar filters on price and trading volume would in all like-
lihood account for much of the size premium reported in this study, which
is concentrated in the quintile of smallest stocks, which would tend also to
have low prices and trading volumes.
While the Dimson Aggregated Coefficients method of estimating beta
seems to compensate best for the effects of thin trading, no attempt has
been made to investigate other robust forms of beta estimation, in particular
to compensate for the mean-reverting tendency of beta estimates and to
reduce the influence of outliers on the estimates. With regard to the former,
it should however be noted that the results of a portfolio-based study such as
this would not be altered by the estimation of betas on the bases proposed,
for example, by Vasicek (1973) and Blume (1975): such methods do not












quantile portfolios. The most robust method for beta estimation for South
African equities remains an open question, however, and it is not beyond the
realms of possibility that another method may yield the positive relationship
between beta and return predicted by theory. However, the evidence so far
suggests that it is overwhelmingly unlikely that any single-index model could
adequately describe the cross-section of returns on the South African equity
market.
Finally, an important extension to this research would be the construc-
tion of a multifactor equilibrium pricing model based on its insights, and
those which may be provided by the research avenues suggested above. This
study provides unambiguous confirmation of the evidence presented by Van
Rensburg and Robertson (2003a) that the CAPM is unable to explain or
describe the generation of returns on the JSE Securities Exchange, and its
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Summary of analysis data
Figure A.1 shows the number of stocks, and their total market capitalisation
in billions of Rands, at each month-end over the sample period from 31
December 1993 to 31 October 2007.













The respective figures at each year-end in the sample are set out in Table
A.1 below.
Table A.1: Summary of data




























Adjustments to raw data
This Appendix summarises the adjustment made to the data set downloaded
from I-Net Bridge prior to performing the analysis described in the disserta-
tion.
B.1 Missing dividend yields
Several records in the downloaded data had blank entries in the dividend
yield field. All missing dividend yields were set to zero, except where the
correct values were obvious from surrounding data.
B.2 Missing earnings yields
Missing earnings yields were replaced by those calculated from the implied
earnings of surrounding records.
B.3 Preference and non-voting shares
All shares other than ordinary shares were denoted by identifying suffixes,












B.4 High dividend yields
Dividend yields in excess of 150% were set to zero where these persisted
for periods of more than twelve months, as these were typically the result
of stocks whose prices had collapsed and had suspended trading prior to
ultimate delisting. The data was not adjusted where such series persisted for
shorter periods.
B.5 Market capitalisation data
Market capitalisation was calculated by multiplying stock price by the num-
ber of shares in issue (where the latter item was missing, shares in issue
from the last or next available month were used. Where no shares in is-
sue data were available, all data for the stocks in question were discarded:
this affected share codes BLRX (30/9/91 to 31/1/96), FSG1X (30/9/91
to 30/9/94), MIMX (30/9/91 to 30/4/94), OMCX (30/11/92 to 30/9/94),
OSLX (30/9/91 to 30/4/94), SCOX (30/6/92 to 28/2/94), SFTX (30/9/91
to 31/3/94), VDKX (30/9/91 to 30/9/94) and WELX (30/9/91 to 30/4/94).
Apart from the above, market capitalisation figures were accepted, al-
though there were several instances of significant changes in the number of
shares in issue from month to month; according to I-Net’s stated policy,
rights issues and share splits should have been corrected for in the price and
shares in issue history (and in most instances, this appears to have been done
correctly).
B.6 High returns
All returns in excess of 100% in a single month were checked; all appeared
to be correct in the absence of contradictory evidence from external sources.
There were four stocks which exhibited returns in excess of 900% in a single












influence on the results, in particular on the returns (and their skewness and
kurtosis) of the smallest quintile. These were mostly stocks whose price had
fallen to one cent and then rebounded significantly on the back of positive
news. In view of the influence of these stocks’ returns on the results, they
were excluded from the data set.
B.7 Duplicate share codes
I-Net Bridge’s practice is to add an ‘X’ suffix to a stock’s code when it is
delisted. In several instances stocks appeared to have two distinct price series
with an extra ‘X’ added onto the second code. Where there was a gap in dates
between the two series, all data was retained, with the two being treated as
separate series. Where the series overlapped, in some cases it was clear that
one series was partially a replication of the other, and the duplication was
eliminated from the data set.
B.8 Other
All 30 September 2005 values for share code CENX were zero; these were re-
placed by the values at 31 August 2005 and 31 October 2005, which were iden-
tical to each other. Some obvious errors in price progressions were amended














minus 50% return on delisting
C.1 Size effect
Table C.1: Results for portfolios formed on market capitalisation (assuming
-50% return on delisting)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 2.95% 7.83% 14.24% 30.34%
2 1.59% 4.70% 9.50% 21.70%
3 1.79% 5.31% 11.04% 22.27%
4 1.30% 4.34% 8.67% 18.52%
5 1.37% 4.19% 8.46% 16.83%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 1.58% *** 3.64% *** 5.78% *** 13.51% ***
1-2 1.36% ** 3.13% *** 4.74% *** 8.65% ***












As was the case with an assumed minus 100% return on delisting, the
size premium, defined as the difference between returns of extreme quintiles,
is significant across the holding periods considered; in fact, the results for
one- and three-month are now significant at the 1% level, as for six- and
twelve-month holding periods. Again, this is concentrated in the smallest
size quintile, with the difference in mean returns between quintiles 1 and 2
being significant at 5% for a one-month holding periods and at 1% for longer
holding periods.
C.2 Value effect
Table C.2: Results for portfolios formed on PE ratio (assuming -50% return
on delisting)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 2.85% 6.78% 11.45% 23.21%
2 1.73% 5.74% 12.26% 25.33%
3 1.88% 5.41% 10.42% 23.55%
4 1.35% 4.44% 8.98% 19.53%
5 1.21% 4.03% 8.84% 18.14%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 1.64% *** 2.75% ** 2.61% 5.07% **
1-3 0.97% * 1.37% 1.03% -0.35%
3-5 0.67% 1.38% 1.58% 5.42% **
Again, the conclusions are very similar to those based on a minus 100%
delisting return, with the main difference being that the difference in mean
return between extreme quintiles, of 5.07%, for a twelve-month holding period












reported in section 9.2 was not significant.
C.3 Beta effect
C.3.1 OLS beta
Table C.3: Results for portfolios formed on OLS beta (assuming -50% return
on delisting)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 2.26% 6.34% 11.94% 24.36%
2 2.00% 5.98% 12.25% 26.58%
3 1.82% 5.54% 11.01% 23.47%
4 1.78% 5.22% 10.27% 21.68%
5 1.15% 3.33% 6.49% 13.69%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 1.11% * 3.01% *** 5.45% *** 10.67% ***
1-4 0.48% 1.11% 1.68% 2.68%
4-5 0.63% 1.89% 3.77% ** 7.99% ***
The reported significance levels of the above results are the same as those













Table C.4: Results for portfolios formed on Scholes-Williams beta (assuming
-50% return on delisting)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 2.50% 7.14% 13.81% 29.96%
2 1.91% 5.53% 11.34% 24.54%
3 1.89% 5.43% 10.35% 21.67%
4 1.43% 4.42% 8.61% 16.41%
5 1.28% 3.88% 7.82% 17.11%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 1.22% ** 3.25% *** 6.00% *** 12.86% ***
1-2 0.58% 1.61% 2.48% * 5.42% **
2-5 0.64% 1.64% 3.52% ** 7.44% ***
The reported significance levels of the above results are almost identical
to those assuming a minus 100% return on delisting, the only exceptions
being that the three-month return differential between quintiles 1 and 2 is
no longer significant at 10%, while the reported significance level of the six-












C.3.3 Dimson beta (lead and lag 2 months)
Table C.5: Results for portfolios formed on Dimson beta (lead and lag 2
months, assuming -50% return on delisting)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 2.15% 6.29% 12.21% 26.40%
2 1.70% 5.33% 10.74% 22.31%
3 1.95% 5.21% 10.58% 23.07%
4 1.75% 5.26% 9.94% 20.51%
5 1.46% 4.30% 8.47% 17.45%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 0.69% 2.00% * 3.74% ** 8.95% ***
1-3 0.20% 1.08% 1.63% 3.33%
3-5 0.49% 0.91% 2.11% 5.62% **
The reported significance levels of the above results are the same as those












C.3.4 Dimson beta (lead and lag 3 months)
Table C.6: Results for portfolios formed on Dimson beta (lead and lag 3
months, assuming -50% return on delisting)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 1.93% 5.33% 10.42% 24.01%
2 1.90% 5.63% 10.99% 23.04%
3 1.69% 5.32% 10.81% 21.87%
4 1.77% 5.15% 10.09% 21.82%
5 1.73% 4.98% 9.63% 19.01%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 0.19% 0.35% 0.79% 4.99% *
1-3 0.24% 0.02% -0.39% 2.14%
3-5 -0.04% 0.33% 1.18% 2.86%
The reported significance levels of the above results are almost identical
to those assuming a minus 100% return on delisting, with the only exception
being the difference between extreme quintiles for a twelve-month holding
period now only being significant at the 10% level, against the 5% level












C.3.5 Dimson beta (lead and lag 5 months)
Table C.7: Results for portfolios formed on Dimson beta (lead and lag 5
months, assuming -50% return on delisting)
Holding period
Portfolio 1 3 6 12
1 1.98% 5.58% 10.50% 21.81%
2 1.81% 5.61% 11.56% 25.15%
3 1.83% 5.00% 10.27% 22.95%
4 2.02% 5.78% 10.92% 22.10%
5 1.37% 4.43% 8.72% 17.78%
Differences between portfolios
1-5 0.62% 1.16% 1.77% 4.04%
1-3 0.15% 0.58% 0.23% -1.13%
3-5 0.46% 0.58% 1.55% 5.17% **
The reported significance levels of the above results are almost identical
to those assuming a minus 100% return on delisting, with some differences
for the twelve-month holding period.
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